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Moral Conflict and Liberty:  
Gay Rights and Religion 
Chai R. Feldblum†
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you and your same-sex male partner got 
married last year in Massachusetts and are now planning a 
delayed honeymoon in Tennessee.  You search the Web and 
find a lovely guesthouse in your price range.  Nothing about the 
guesthouse’s description on the Web site makes you think you 
will not be welcome there.  You make reservations through the 
Web site. 
The two of you arrive at the guesthouse, sporting your 
wedding rings and calling each other “honey.”  The owner of 
the guesthouse asks if you are gay.  You answer that you are 
and explain that this is your delayed honeymoon.  The owner is 
very gracious and courteous, but explains that you cannot stay 
in his guesthouse unless you agree to sleep in separate rooms 
and also agree not to engage in any sexual activity during your 
stay.  He explains that his religion requires that he “love the 
sinner, but hate the sin.”  For this reason, you are welcome to 
stay at his guesthouse, but only if you do not use his facilities 
to carry out sinful activities. 
The owner also gives you a list of guesthouses in town 
that do allow gay couples to stay in the same room.  And, he 
 † Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  A version of this 
paper was first delivered at Brooklyn Law School as part of the Symposium on Justice 
Blackmun and Judicial Biography in September 2005.  A subsequent version of the 
paper was presented during a meeting hosted by the Becket Fund in December 2005.  
The Becket Fund meeting was expressly designed to consider the impact that legal 
recognition of civil marriage for same-sex couples might have on religious people.  See 
Scholars’ Conference on Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, http://www.becket 
fund.org/index.php/article/494.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  Preparing a paper for 
that meeting both gave me an opportunity, and forced me, to engage with an issue that 
I had considered only briefly in previous scholarship.  I benefited greatly from 
questions and comments in both venues.  This article appears in this law review and, 
with some revisions, it will appear in a book of the various papers delivered at the 
Becket Fund meeting.  I am indebted to the research assistance of Amy Simmerman 
and Alyssa Rayman-Read. 
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quickly assures you, he has checked and there is no law that 
prohibits him from treating you in this way. 
Let us assume that all the other guesthouses are full, so 
you decide to stay at the original guesthouse, under the owner’s 
rules.  No one can claim that the guesthouse’s rules prohibit 
you from “being gay.”  Your identity as a gay person does not 
disappear simply because you have not been able to engage in 
the conduct of having sex with your same-sex partner over one 
weekend.  But it would be foolish to imagine that one’s identity 
as a gay person would have any real meaning if one was 
consistently precluded from having sex with one’s same-sex 
partner.  This identity—this identity liberty, as I hope to 
explain below—is necessarily curtailed by the absence of a law 
that prohibits public accommodations from discriminating 
against you on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Now imagine that you and your opposite-sex wife have 
decided to open a Christian bed and breakfast.  You view your 
guesthouse as a haven for God-fearing, evangelical Christians.  
You do not advertise generally on the Web, only on Christian 
sites.  You make it very clear in all your advertisements that 
you run a Christian business and that you will not rent rooms 
to cohabiting, homosexual couples (married or not) or to 
cohabiting, heterosexual couples who are not married.  One day 
you are sued because your state has a law prohibiting 
discrimination based on marital status and sexual orientation.  
The court rules that the law places no burden on your religious 
beliefs because your religion does not require you to operate a 
guesthouse.  You are ordered to change your guesthouse’s 
rules. 
No one can claim that the court order prohibits you from 
“being religious.”  The court has explained that you may 
continue to hold whatever beliefs you want about sexual 
practices.  You simply may not impose your beliefs on others.  
However, you feel it is foolish to imagine that your beliefs and 
identity as a religious person can be disaggregated from your 
conduct.  Your religious belief—your belief liberty interest, as I 
hope to explain below—is necessarily curtailed by the existence 
of a law that prohibits you from discriminating on the basis of 
sexual orientation or marital status. 
We tend not to think of these conflict situations in the 
language of conflicting liberties, and certainly not in the 
language of liberties that have something in common, even as 
they conflict.  Those who advocate for laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation tend to talk 
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simply about “equality.”  Those who seek to stop such laws 
from coming into existence, or who seek religious exemptions 
from these laws, tend to talk about “morality” and/or “religious 
freedom.”  These groups tend to talk past each other, rather 
than with each other. 
My goal in this piece is to surface some of the 
commonalities between religious belief liberty and sexual 
orientation identity liberty and to offer some public policy 
suggestions for what to do when these liberties conflict.  I first 
want to make transparent the conflict that I believe exists 
between laws intended to protect the liberty of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) people so that they may 
live lives of dignity and integrity and the religious beliefs of 
some individuals whose conduct is regulated by such laws.  I 
believe those who advocate for LGBT equality have 
downplayed the impact of such laws on some people’s religious 
beliefs and, equally, I believe those who have sought religious 
exemptions from such civil rights laws have downplayed the 
impact that such exemptions would have on LGBT people.   
Second, I want to suggest that the best framework for 
dealing with the conflict between some people’s religious beliefs 
and LGBT people’s identity liberty is to analyze religious 
people’s claims as belief liberty interests under the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than 
as free exercise claims under the First Amendment.  There 
were important historical reasons for including the First 
Amendment in our Constitution, with its dual Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses.1  But the First Amendment need 
not be understood as the sole source of protection for religious 
people when the claims they raise also implicate the type of 
liberty interests that can legitimately be considered under the 
Due Process Clauses of our Constitution.2
  
 1 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947) (discussing these 
historical reasons, including the early Americans’ desire to escape the “bondage” of 
European laws that compelled citizens to attend and support government-favored 
religions, and the colonial governments’ practice of taxing citizens to pay for, among 
other things, ministers’ salaries and the construction of churches). 
 2 As a practical matter, of course, current constitutional doctrine would 
provide minimal protection to any individual who experienced a civil rights law as 
burdening his or her religious beliefs or practices.  Under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a neutral law that burdens 
religious beliefs will be sustained as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.  But the catalyst for my argument is not the strategic one of 
offering religious people a “second bite at the apple” post-Smith.  Rather, as I hope to 
make clear in this article, I believe it is simply more appropriate to analyze religious 
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My argument in this article is that intellectual 
coherence and ethical integrity demand that we acknowledge 
that civil rights laws can burden an individual’s belief liberty 
interest when the conduct demanded by these laws burdens an 
individual’s core beliefs, whether these beliefs are religiously 
based or secularly based.  Acknowledging such a liberty 
interest will not necessarily result in the invalidation of the 
law or the granting of an exemption for the religious 
individual.  Rather, as I hope to demonstrate below, Justice 
Souter’s concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg3 offers us a 
useful approach for engaging in the required substantive due 
process analysis, in a manner that provides us with a means of 
seriously considering the liberty interest at stake without 
necessarily invalidating the law burdening that interest. 
Finally, I offer my own assessment of how these 
conflicts might be resolved in our democratic system.  I have no 
illusions that either LGBT rights advocates or religious 
freedom advocates will decide I have offered the correct 
resolution.  But my primary goal in this piece is simply to 
argue that this conflict needs to be acknowledged in a respectful 
manner by both sides, and then addressed through the 
legislative processes of our democratic system.  Whether my 
particular resolution is ultimately accepted feels less important 
to me than helping to foster a fruitful conversation about 
possible resolutions.4  
  
belief claims as liberty claims, and not to elevate religious beliefs over other deeply 
held beliefs derived from sources other than religion. 
 3 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 4 Among the law review articles and notes that have been written on this 
issue (all from the perspective of free exercise claims), some have suggested a balancing 
of interests, while others have focused on justifying either the religious interest or the 
non-discrimination perspective. Surprisingly to me, I found a limited number of articles 
on the subject overall.  See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: 
Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 393, 438, 444 (1994) (arguing that anti-discrimination legislation based on 
sexual orientation is not a compelling interest like gender or race because 
homosexuality is still “morally controversial” and government should not legislate a 
particular view of sexual morality); Marie A. Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A 
Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious 
Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 425-28 (2001) (proposing a remedies approach 
under which a landlord would be held liable for discrimination based on religious 
beliefs, but under which damages would be limited, so as to recognize and honor the 
landlord’s religious beliefs, discourage frivolous claims challenging those religious 
beliefs, and strike a balance between the parties’ “consciences”); Harlan Loeb & David 
Rosenberg, Fundamental Rights in Conflict: The Price of a Maturing Democracy, 77 
N.D. L. REV. 27, 49 (2001) (suggesting individual religious-based exemptions that could 
be overridden by a state’s compelling interest in limited circumstances); Maureen E. 
Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29 
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II. A JUSTICE BLACKMUN STORY 
A. We Love You Anyway/We Love You 
When I delivered this paper as a talk during the 
symposium on the judicial biography of Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun, I titled it: We Love You Anyway/We Love You: 
Justice Blackmun, Gay Rights and Religion.  The phrase “We 
love you anyway/We love you” came from Justice Blackmun’s 
response to me when I informed him I was a lesbian.  As I 
explain below, the difference in meaning between those two 
responses can help illuminate the conflict that arises between 
some people’s religious liberty and LGBT people’s full liberty 
rights. 
But to begin in the spirit of judicial biography, I want to 
consider Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick5 
and, in particular, his reaction to the responses he received to 
that dissent.  In her book Becoming Justice Blackmun, Linda 
Greenhouse eloquently documents how the public response to 
Roe v. Wade6 impacted Justice Blackmun’s views on women’s 
rights.7  I believe the responses the Justice received to his 
dissent in Hardwick had a similar impact on his subsequent 
views on gay rights.   
  
RUTGERS L.J. 487, 549-52 (1998) (suggesting proposals for a modification or 
replacement of the compelling state interest test in free exercise cases that have the 
hallmarks of voluntary commercial activity and third party harm); Maureen E. 
Markey, The Price of Landlord’s “Free” Exercise of Religion: Tenant’s Right to 
Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 702-03 (1995) 
(arguing against individual religious-based exemptions from civil rights laws because 
allowing free exercise claims to trump civil rights laws could be the death knell for civil 
rights); Stephanie Hammond Knutson, Note, The Religious Landlord and the Conflict 
Between Free Exercise Rights and Housing Discrimination Laws—Which Interest 
Prevails?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1669, 1726-31 (1996) (noting difficulty in weighing civil 
rights interests and religious interests and proposing a religious exemption for small 
landlords); Alvin C. Lin, Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the 
Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 
89 GEO. L.J. 719, 748-51 (2001) (arguing against individual religious-based exemptions 
from civil rights laws because they inject a troubling “morality” inquiry into civil rights 
laws that are not based on morality concerns); Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The Collision 
of Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1201, 1231 (1989) (urging protection for religious groups when the group looks 
“inward” to itself as a religious community, but not when the group “turns outwards” in 
providing services to others in the community).  
 5 478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 6 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 7 LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 207-27 (2005). 
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In Hardwick, a 5-4 decision written by Justice Byron 
White, the Court ruled that the federal constitutional right of 
privacy did not prohibit the State of Georgia from criminalizing 
the sexual act of sodomy.8  This decision was a huge blow to 
gay rights advocates across the country.  In a folder containing 
Justice Blackmun’s materials on the Hardwick case, he saved 
copies of several articles from the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, with headlines like “Friend and Foe See 
Homosexual Defeat” and “Sodomy Ruling’s Implications 
Extend Far Beyond Bedroom.”9
The Hardwick case was argued on March 31, 1986.  
From about mid-May on, I awaited the decision with tension 
and anticipation.  At the time, I was clerking for Judge Frank 
M. Coffin, who sat on the First Circuit Court of Appeals and 
whose chambers were in Portland, Maine.  I was scheduled to 
begin my clerkship with Justice Harry A. Blackmun in July 
1986.  So, starting in mid-May, I would call the Supreme 
Court’s public number every Monday morning to find out if the 
Hardwick decision had been handed down—to find out whether 
it would be a huge step forward or backward for gay rights and 
to find out how my soon-to-be new boss had voted in the case. 
I remember clearly when I heard the news of the 
decision.  Like so many others, I was upset and distraught by 
  
 8 478 U.S. at 189.  As Justice White described the case:  
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy 
between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular, 
are wise or desirable.  It raises no question about the right or propriety of 
state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual 
sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state 
constitutional grounds.  The issue presented is whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make 
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.   
Id. at 190. 
 9 Larry Rohter, Friend and Foe See Homosexual Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
1986, at A19 (‘‘‘It’s a major disaster from our point of view,’ said Thomas Stoddard, 
executive director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a leading 
homosexual advocacy group.  ‘For the gay rights movement, this is our Dred Scott case,’ 
he said referring to the 1857 Supreme Court ruling upholding slavery in which blacks 
were held not to be citizens.”); Ruth Marcus, Sodomy Ruling’s Implications Extend Far 
Beyond Bedroom, WASH. POST, July 2, 1986, at A1 (“The court’s decision ‘will not doom 
every gay-rights case in every context in the future,’ said Nan Hunter of the American 
Civil Liberties Union.  But, she said, ‘the preservation of the sodomy laws provides an 
excuse for the courts to invoke when we have successfully proved that there is no nexus 
between homosexuality and job performance, or between homosexuality and parenting 
ability . . . .  Even though there is little criminal prosecution, the sodomy laws are 
invoked frequently.’” (alteration in original)).  
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the outcome.  But I was elated that the Justice I was to work 
for had dissented.  And not only had he dissented, but as I read 
the opinion a few days later, he had authored what I viewed as 
a ringing endorsement of equality and protection for gay 
people.  I was off to work for my champion! 
I began work at the Supreme Court in July 1986.  
Although I had self-identified as a bisexual for the previous six 
years (and had been open about my sexual orientation with 
Judge Coffin and my co-clerks in that chambers), I held off 
saying anything about my sexual orientation for the first few 
weeks.  And as July and August progressed, I became even 
more reticent. 
My hesitation had everything to do with my observation 
of the way Justice Blackmun reacted to the reactions to his 
dissent. 
The Justice’s dissent in Hardwick had included several 
eloquent and thoughtful statements about gay people.  For 
example:  
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual 
intimacy is “a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central 
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human 
personality.”  The fact that individuals define themselves in a 
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with 
others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be 
many “right” ways of conducting those relationships, and that much 
of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an 
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely 
personal bonds.10
Reading an affirming statement such as this, in a 
Supreme Court opinion no less, was an incredible experience 
for many gay people.  In reaction, gay men and lesbians across 
the country poured out their gratitude, and often their stories, 
in letters to the Justice.  Justice Blackmun read every piece of 
mail he received and he responded to a fair percentage of that 
mail.  He also reported on many of these letters during his 
daily breakfasts with us, his four new clerks.  
Watching Justice Blackmun respond to these letters 
was a fascinating, and yet sobering, experience for me.  I 
realized that while the Justice had put his name on eloquent 
statements about gay people that had warmed my heart (and 
the hearts of so many others), he had not necessarily 
experienced those same statements on an emotional plane.  For 
  
 10 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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that reason, the stark (and sometimes heart-wrenching) 
emotion that came through these letters sometimes, I think, 
simply bemused the Justice.   
Ultimately, I believe the honesty and intense emotion of 
these letters opened Justice Blackmun’s eyes to the daily 
injustices faced by gay people across the country and 
radicalized him in a way that simply thinking about the legal 
question of the scope of privacy for sodomy could not.  But 
Justice Blackmun’s initial reaction to the deluge of letters was 
mostly to marvel at how many gay people there seemed to be 
out there.  He was even more amazed when he found out that 
he actually knew some of them.  I vividly remember one 
breakfast at which Justice Blackmun reported receiving a 
letter the previous day from the son of a close friend.  In the 
letter, the young man told him he was gay and went on at 
length to explain how personally important Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent in Hardwick had been for him.  Although the Justice 
was clearly moved by this letter, he was also clearly astonished 
that this “lovely young man” was “a homosexual.”  Indeed, he 
confided in us, he wasn’t sure the young man’s father knew yet 
that his son was a homosexual.  
Listening to Justice Blackmun during those first few 
months made me decide to closet my own sexual orientation.  It 
was not that I feared overt discrimination by the Justice.  I did 
not.  But I did fear and shrink from his overt discomfort.  It 
was clear to me that the Justice was not comfortable with 
“homosexuals” (as he called them), despite his strong support 
for their right of privacy.  And, indeed, as I would come to see 
when I taught Justice Blackmun’s Hardwick dissent in my 
Sexual Orientation and the Law class several years later, some 
of that discomfort is evident in the opinion itself.11  
So I chose the comfort and ease of the closet, as so many 
of us who do not otherwise defy gender stereotypes are able to 
do.  I did not feel particularly good about it, but I also did not 
feel that I needed to “educate” my Justice any further by 
coming out.12
  
 11 See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.  
 12 The irony of my closeting myself was, nevertheless, apparent to me each 
time Justice Blackmun told us how astonishing it was that Justice Powell had confided 
in him the previous term that he (Justice Powell) had “never met a homosexual.”  
Justice Blackmun found this statement to be particularly bizarre because had heard 
from his own clerks that one of Justice Powell’s clerks the previous year was gay.  I 
think Justice Blackmun often wondered whether Justice Powell would have joined 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion (turning it from a dissent into a majority) had he realized 
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In 1991, four years following my clerkship, I finally told 
Justice Blackmun that I was a lesbian. I was nervous about 
doing so, remembering the Justice’s discomfort with 
homosexuality.  I believe the Justice’s residual discomfort with 
homosexuals was still there when I told him.  Yet his reaction 
was telling and moving—encapsulating the nugget of 
resistance to full equality for gay people that continues to exist 
in our country, while still suggesting future possibilities for 
real equality.  
Here was my exchange with the Justice (as best as I can 
remember it fifteen years later): 
Chai: “Mr. Justice, I have something important to tell you.  I want to 
let you know that I’ve finally met someone and I’m really happy and 
I’m really in love and we’re living together and . . . she’s a woman.” 
Short pause. 
Justice Blackmun: “Well, Chai . . . you know we want you to be 
happy . . . and we care about you . . . and we love you anyway.” 
Half beat of silence; Chai looks at the Justice. 
Justice Blackmun: “You know, we love you.” 
I believe there is a world of difference and a depth of 
meaning between “We love you anyway” and “We love you.”  
Let me explicate that difference by considering three possible 
views that one might hold about gay people and gay sex.  Each 
of these views, I believe, holds sway in some segment of our 
society today. 
B. Three Views of Gay Sex 
One possible view of gay sex is that it is morally 
harmful (and/or sinful) to the individual and to the community.  
Therefore, it must be discouraged to the greatest extent 
possible in order to advance the moral health of these 
individuals and of the communities in which they reside.  The 
second view is that gay sexual activity is not good, but it is not 
inherently harmful; it is more akin to an unfortunate, 
abnormal health condition that one does not wish for oneself 
(or for one’s children or law clerks), but it is not a harmful 
  
that he did know a “lovely young man” who was a homosexual.  As has since been 
reported, that clerk anguished about whether to come out to Justice Powell, but 
ultimately chose not to.  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521-
22 (1994). 
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element that must be actively purged from society.  The third 
view is that gay sexual activity has the same moral valence as 
heterosexual activity and gay people are basically similar to 
straight people. 
The first view of gay sex is the one underlying Justice 
White’s majority decision in Hardwick and Justice Burger’s 
concurrence in that case.  It is this view that best explains the 
(in)famous sentence in Justice White’s opinion: “No connection 
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, 
either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent.”13
This simple, conclusory statement that homosexual sex 
has nothing to do with marriage and family, while heterosexual 
sex presumably has something or a great deal to do with such 
matters, will come as a great surprise to the many gay couples 
who feel their sexual activity cements their personal intimacy 
and perhaps their marital relationships.  But Justice White’s 
conclusory statement is valid if one assumes that homosexual 
sex is immoral, wrong, harmful and sinful, and hence 
necessarily antithetical to such moral goods as marriage and 
family. 
Indeed, this assumption is also what gives logical force 
to Justice White’s statement that if the Court were to accept 
Hardwick’s argument, “[I]t would be difficult, except by fiat, to 
limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving 
exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual 
crimes even though they are committed in the home.”14
Why would a court need to resort to “fiat” to find a 
distinction between homosexual conduct and incest, and not 
similarly have been required over the years to have resorted to 
“fiat” to find a distinction between heterosexual conduct and 
incest?  Only if homosexual sex is as harmful and immoral as 
incest and other sexual crimes and thus logically offers no 
coherent manner of providing a distinction.  According to the 
first view of gay sex, this is indeed the case.  Under that view, 
the only way a court can possibly distinguish between the harm 
of homosexual conduct and the harm of these other sexual 
crimes is “by fiat.” 
A second possible view of gay sex is that while it is not 
good, it is also not inherently harmful.  A person holding this 
  
 13 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. 
 14 Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added). 
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view might believe that a desire for gay sex is abnormal and 
that being gay is not a preferred sexual orientation (he/she 
would certainly not want his/her own child to be gay).  But, 
nevertheless, this person might believe that gay sexual activity 
is not inherently harmful to the individual and is not a moral 
stain on society; it is simply an “unfortunate condition” with 
which some people are born.  Someone with this view might 
believe that individuals who are born with this unfortunate or 
aberrant condition should be tolerated by society and not 
penalized for their sexual orientation.  At the same time, a 
person with such a view would be quite comfortable with 
societal rules that demonstrate a preference for the more 
normal and natural condition of heterosexual orientation—for 
example, a societal rule that restricts civil marriage benefits to 
heterosexual couples without extending similar societal 
affirmation to gay couples. 
Although it is hard to know for sure, my instinct is that 
this second view reflects Justice Blackmun’s beliefs in 1991.  I 
think this is the view that is captured by the phrase: “We love 
you anyway.”  What I heard in that phrase was: “We are really 
sorry you have been afflicted with this condition; we are so glad 
to see that you are dealing with it so well, and we love you 
despite this condition.”15
I think one can also discern aspects of this view in 
selected statements in Justice Blackmun’s Hardwick dissent.  
For example, shortly following the eloquent statement about 
personal intimacy that I quoted above, Justice Blackmun goes 
on to observe the following: 
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary 
corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their 
lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make 
different choices.  For example, in holding that the clearly important 
state interest in public education should give way to a competing 
claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal schooling 
threatened their way of life, the Court declared: “There can be no 
assumption that today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others 
like them are ‘wrong.’  A way of life that is odd or even erratic but 
  
 15 It was also interesting to me that Justice Blackmun used the phrase “we” 
in his response.  That was so striking that I remember it these many years later.  I 
think Justice Blackmun might have explained the use of “we” as intending to 
encompass himself, Dottie (his wife), Wanda and Wannett (the two secretaries), i.e., 
the “family” of the Blackmun Chambers.  But I think it was also a use of a term that 
was intentionally distancing, and less personal, than “I feel / I think.”  It is also, as 
Alyssa Rayman-Read points out, a term that placed me as the “other,” and all the 
normal heterosexuals as the “we.” 
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interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned 
because it is different.”  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-224 
(1972).  The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to 
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; 
what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental 
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their 
intimate associations with others.16
And although the paragraph ends there, one has the 
sense that the author is saying to himself, “Even if that 
intimate association is sort of ‘odd or even erratic,’ or maybe 
just a bit unfortunate—like a bad medical condition.”  The type 
of condition that might make you love your law clerk “anyway.” 
A third possible view of gay sex is that it has the same 
moral valence as heterosexual sex.  Both types of sex are 
equally normal (or equally bizarre, as sex often is); both types 
of sex partake of the same moral value when used to enhance 
personal intimacy or to bring pleasure in a consensual 
relationship; and both types of sex are morally bad when used 
to subjugate or harm one of the parties.   
Consistent with this view (and depending on one’s view 
of the role of government), one can easily believe that 
government has a role, for example, in creating a civil marriage 
structure to support heterosexual and homosexual activity 
designed to further personal intimacy and perhaps to include 
the raising of children.  Under this view, it would certainly be 
irrational for the government to exclude couples that use gay 
sex to create the same personal intimacy structure for which 
other couples use heterosexual sex.17   
As Michael Sandel pointed out in an early article 
analyzing Hardwick and Roe v. Wade, if Justice Blackmun had 
believed that homosexual and heterosexual sex were morally 
equivalent, his dissent could have been written quite 
differently.18  That is, instead of basing Michael Hardwick’s 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy on the line of privacy 
  
 16 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
 17 Even under this view, it is not clear why government should be supporting 
only couples who are using sexual intimacy to cement their personal intimacy, as 
opposed to relationships that use other forms of connections to cement similar, socially 
useful bonds.  See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for 
Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005) [hereinafter 
Feldblum, Gay Is Good] (making the case for societal support of non-sexual domestic 
partners). 
 18 Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and 
Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (1989).   
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cases that protected one’s “right to be let alone,”19 Justice 
Blackmun could have rested his analysis directly on the line of 
cases affirming an individual’s privacy right to enjoy intimate 
relationships within families and among those rearing 
children.20  That is, following Justice White’s statement that he 
could perceive no connection between “family, marriage, or 
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the 
other,”21 Justice Blackmun could have responded:  “Of course 
there is a connection.  Homosexual activity and heterosexual 
activity are equivalent—and both are used to facilitate 
important moral goods such as family and marriage.” 
But I do not think Justice Blackmun, in 1986, would 
have been comfortable making such a claim of moral 
equivalency between heterosexual and homosexual sex.  Nor do 
I believe he accepted such an equivalency in 1991, leading to 
this reaction when finding out I was a lesbian: “We love you 
anyway.”   
I think Justice Blackmun stretched himself to perceive 
the contours of the third view of gay sex (and, by extension, gay 
people) in his amended statement of “We love you.”  My guess 
is that he truly felt: “It must be terrible to have this horrible 
condition, Chai, but we love you anyway.”  But he must have 
quickly gathered that I did not experience that reaction as 
positive.  I think he suddenly realized that I did not think I had 
a horrible condition and so I was not asking for tolerance or 
sympathy. I was actually asking him to be happy for me 
because I had finally found someone I loved.  I was asking to be 
treated in the same way he would have treated any other clerk 
who had just said to him, “I am so happy.  I have found the 
person I want to marry!” 
I think that realization is what prompted Justice 
Blackmun to say “We love you,” and to take away the 
“anyway.”  I do not think he was as happy for me as he would 
have been had I said, “I’m getting married to a man.”  But he 
did discern that I was happy and that I did not experience 
  
 19 In the first paragraph of his dissent, Justice Blackmun announces that 
“this case is about ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’”  Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (quoting 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 20 Sandel, supra note 18, at 533-38.  See also Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual 
Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 331-34 
(1996) [hereinafter Feldblum, Sexual Orientation] (discussing Sandel’s insights and 
making the case for the moral equivalency of gay and heterosexual sex). 
 21 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. 
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myself as afflicted with an unfortunate social, physical or 
mental condition.  And so he stretched himself to acknowledge 
that fact. 
These alternative views of gay sex and gay people can 
be directly correlated with a range of governmental policies.  
The first view is the one that criminalizes homosexual sodomy 
and removes children from parents who are gay.22  The second 
view is what permits legislators to vote for a bill that prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual 
orientation and to vote (on the same day) for a bill that 
prohibits the federal government from recognizing state civil 
marriages between same-sex couples.23  The third view is what 
would ensure complete and total equality for gay people, 
without apologetics or qualifications. 
But even the second view (which is probably the 
predominant view in this country today)24 poses challenges to 
those individuals who adhere to the first view of gay sex.  
There is a significant difference between a belief that a 
characteristic is morally problematic and is best expunged or 
repressed and a belief that a characteristic is unfortunate but 
should be tolerated by society to some minimal extent.  While, 
  
 22 For example, in 1885, Oscar Wilde was imprisoned under Section 11 of the 
1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act for his relationship with the Marquess of 
Queensbury.  Judith Fingard, Book Review, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 83, 83 (1999) 
(reviewing MICHAEL S. FOLDY, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE: DEVIANCE, MORALITY, 
AND LATE-VICTORIAN SOCIETY (1997)).  The court sentenced Wilde to two years of hard 
labor for “gross indecency” and “extensive corruption of the most hideous kind.” Id.   
See, e.g., Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring) 
(supporting denial of child custody to lesbian mother and stating that “Homosexual 
conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against 
nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this 
Nation and our laws are predicated.  Such conduct violates both the criminal and civil 
laws of this State and is destructive to a basic building block of society—the family.  
The law of Alabama is not only clear in its condemning such conduct, but the courts of 
this State have consistently held that exposing a child to such behavior has a 
destructive and seriously detrimental effect on the children.  It is an inherent evil 
against which children must be protected.”); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692, 694 (Va. 
1985) (denying child custody and visitation rights to gay father because he shares a 
“bed and bedroom” with his male lover and stating that “[t]he father’s continuous 
exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and 
improper custodian as a matter of law”). 
 23 See Feldblum, Gay Is Good, supra note 17, at 145-50 (describing Senate 
debate and analysis on the 49-50 vote in favor of the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act and the 85-14 vote in favor of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996).  See also Chai 
R. Feldblum, The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 996 (1997) 
[hereinafter Feldblum, Moral Rhetoric] (describing consistent efforts to justify a vote 
for ENDA as simply a vote for “equality” with no implications for moral views of 
homosexuality). 
 24 See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.   
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obviously, there is even more of a significant difference 
between the first view of gay sex and the third view, even 
governmental policies premised on the second view can cause 
conflict for those who adhere to the first view.   
My guess is that Justice Blackmun continued to evolve 
in his views about gay people, particularly as he worked with 
clerks who were openly gay during their entire tenure with the 
Justice.  I doubt he ever became a full adherent of the third 
view of gay sex (“Gay sex is morally equivalent to straight 
sex”), but I think he might have been inching towards that 
resolution. 
And as I write this article, I wonder how Justice 
Blackmun would have addressed and resolved the conflict I 
explore in this piece.  Based on my experience working with 
him and my knowledge of him as a human being, I feel the 
Justice would have seen and acknowledged the conflict and not 
brushed it under the rug.  As to whether he would have 
resolved the conflict in the manner I recommend in this piece, 
we will never know; some things are simply unfinished sagas. 
III. IMPACT ON BELIEF LIBERTY WHEN PROTECTING LGBT 
LIBERTY 
A. Postulating an Age of LGBT Liberty 
In 2006, the most pressing question for LGBT people 
probably is not, “How can we be sure that we adequately 
consider and take into account the beliefs of those who believe 
we are immoral and sinful?”  At the moment, it seems that 
people who hold that point of view are prevailing in any 
number of states, at the direct expense of LGBT people’s 
liberty.  Over the past decade, forty-one states have passed 
statutory Defense of Marriage Acts, defining marriage as solely 
between a man and a woman.25  Twenty states have amended 
their constitutions to restrict marriage in a similar fashion, 
and eight more states had constitutional amendments on their 
2006 ballots to do the same.26  In thirty-three states, a person 
can be fired from a job, thrown out of his or her apartment or 
  
 25 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  
 26 Id.  Seven out of those eight ballot initiatives passed in November 2006.  
See Monica Davey, Liberals Find Rays of Hope on Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2006, at P16. 
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refused service in a restaurant simply because he or she is gay, 
lesbian or bisexual.27
Given the current state of affairs, I do not disagree that 
the primary focus and energy of the LGBT movement must be 
directed at resisting efforts to deny LGBT people liberty and 
fighting for legislation and judicial outcomes that will allow 
LGBT people to live lives of honesty and safety in today’s 
society.  Indeed, I have spent a fair portion of the last twenty 
years of my professional life engaged in that precise struggle 
and I expect to do more of the same in the future.28  
But I also believe it is only a matter of time before the 
world around us changes significantly.  In some number of 
years (I do not know how many), I believe a majority of 
jurisdictions in this country will have modified their laws so 
that LGBT people will have full equality in our society, 
including access to civil marriage or civil unions that carry the 
same legal effect as civil marriage.  Or perhaps federal 
statutory changes, together with federal constitutional 
decisions, may result in LGBT people achieving full liberty 
across all states.  At the very least, I believe it is worth 
postulating this outcome and considering now, rather than 
later, the impact that the achievement of such liberty might 
have on employers, landlords and others whose moral values 
(derived from religious sources or secular sources) teach them 
  
 27 Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the 
U.S., http://thetaskforce.org/downloads/nondiscriminationmap.pdf (last visited Sept. 
27, 2006).  
 28 From 1988 to 1990, I was a staff attorney with the ACLU AIDS Project and 
the ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project.  In 1993, I was the Legal Director of the 
Campaign for Military Service, an enterprise to help lift the ban on the service of gay 
people in the military.  From 1993 to 1998, I worked as a consultant to the Human 
Rights Campaign, a political organization dedicated to advancing gay rights.  In that 
capacity, I wrote innumerable drafts of a federal bill to establish non-discrimination in 
employment on the basis of sexual orientation and negotiated with groups to bring 
them on to support the bill.  From 1999 to 2006, I was an advisor and consultant to the 
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, another political organization dedicated to 
advancing lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender equality.  I have written amicus 
briefs on behalf of civil rights organizations, religious organizations, and gay rights 
organizations in constitutional cases seeking to establish equality for gay people, 
including the Supreme Courts cases of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and in several lower court cases challenging 
the military’s ban on gay servicemembers.  Since 2002, I have run a Web site designed 
to help law schools respond to the presence of military recruiters that discriminate 
against openly gay law students.  See SolomonResponse.org, 
http://www.solomonresponse.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  And in 2005, I began the 
Moral Values Project, http://www.moralvaluesproject.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2006), 
an enterprise dedicated to bringing a progressive moral voice to issues of sexuality, 
sexual orientation, and gender in the public arena.   
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to hold the first view of gay sex—that is, that same-sex sexual 
conduct is sinful for the individual and harmful to society. 
Why do I believe an era of full LGBT liberty is simply a 
matter of time?  A large part, I am sure, is due to my being an 
optimist who believes that simple truth and justice usually win 
out in the long run and that truth and justice demand full 
liberty for LGBT people. 
But my conviction also comes from observing changes in 
our society over the past twenty years and from reading 
opinion polls.  The polling numbers indicate that an increasing 
number of people in this country simply do not believe 
homosexual orientation and conduct are as “big a deal” as they 
once were.  These individuals may not particularly like 
homosexuality, nor do they believe that homosexuality is 
morally equivalent to heterosexuality.  But they do not seem as 
agitated about homosexuality as they have been in past 
decades. 
No poll that I have seen asks the question directly: “Do 
you think homosexuality is a big deal?”  But a reduced anxiety 
about homosexuality is the overall gestalt that emerges upon 
reviewing the myriad polls that have asked members of the 
American public about their views on homosexuality over the 
past thirty years.  Karlyn Bowman, a resident scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute (“AEI”) who specializes in 
polling data, has done a Herculean task of reviewing and 
compiling information from over 200 polls, conducted from 
1972 to 2006, that have asked questions about the American 
public’s attitudes towards homosexuality.29  Bowman’s report is 
both illuminating and intriguing. 
Bowman begins her report with a section called 
Acceptance and notes the following: 
In 1973, when the National Opinion Research Center at the 
University of Chicago [“NORC”] first asked people about sexual 
relations between two adults of the same sex, 73 percent described 
  
 29 See KARLYN BOWMAN & ADAM FOSTER, AMER. ENTER. INST., ATTITUDES 
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY AND GAY MARRIAGE, http://www.aei.org/publications/ 
filter.all,pubID.14882/pub_detail.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  I do not purport to 
be an expert in polling data nor do I assert that every survey I cite in the following 
paragraphs and footnotes is necessarily free from methodological errors.  My sole 
assertion is that I believe Bowman’s compilation indicates a trend towards the public 
caring less about homosexuality as a morally problematic issue.  That trend is 
sufficient to make me think it is at least probable that civil rights laws protecting the 
liberty of LGBT people might be enacted over the coming decades and that the passage 
of such laws might then burden the liberty of those who believe that homosexuality is 
morally problematic. 
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them as “always wrong” and another 7 percent as “almost always 
wrong.”  When the organization last asked the question in 2004, 58 
percent called them always wrong and 5 percent almost always 
wrong.  NORC interviewers have asked the same question about 
extramarital sexual relations over the period, and they find no 
liberalization in attitudes.30
The Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, 
together with AEI, did a subgroup analysis of the NORC cohort 
data.  Their analysis showed that in the age cohort of 30-44, 
there was an even more significant reduction in the percentage 
of respondents who believed homosexual relations were 
“always wrong.”  In 1973, 74% of respondents in that age 
cohort believed homosexual sexual relations were “always 
wrong.”31  In 2002, only 48% of respondents in that age cohort 
answered that homosexual sexual relations were “always 
wrong”—a reduction of 26%.32
Bowman’s compilation also indicates that an enduring 
half of the American public continues to believe that 
homosexuality is not morally acceptable, although that number 
appears to decrease slightly if respondents are asked about 
“homosexual relationships” or homosexuality as an “acceptable 
alternative lifestyle,” rather than about “homosexual 
behavior.”33  The number of people who say they personally 
  
 30 Id. at 2.  The NORC survey found that 70% of respondents in 1973 thought 
that a married person having sex outside of his or her marriage was “always wrong.”  
Id. at 47.  That number stayed consistently in the 70% range every year the survey was 
conducted until 2004, when 80% of respondents thought extramarital sex was “always 
wrong.”  Id. at 47-48.   
 31 Id. at 3.   
 32 Id.  The subgroup analysis also looked at sex, race, education, church 
attendance, region, party, ideology and family income.  Id.  The significant changes 
among younger people are apparent in other surveys as well.  In a University of 
California at Los Angeles Cooperative Institutional Research Program survey of college 
freshman, 47% of respondents in 1976 answered that “[i]t is important to have laws 
prohibiting homosexual relationships.”  Id. at 6.  By 2005, that number had decreased 
to 25%.  Id.  
 33 For example, a February 2006 survey by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates (“PSRA”)/Pew Research Center found that 50% of respondents believe that 
“homosexual behavior” is “wrong,” and a May 2006 Gallup poll found that 51% of 
respondents believe that “homosexual behavior” is “morally wrong.”  Id. at 4.  A Los 
Angeles Times survey in 2000 found that 51% of respondents believed that “sexual 
relations between adults of the same gender” is “always wrong.”  Id.  By contrast, a 
February 2004 Harris/CNN/Time poll found that only 38% of respondents considered 
“homosexual relationships” to be “not acceptable,” while 49% considered them 
acceptable for others but not themselves, and 11% considered them acceptable both for 
others and for themselves.  Id. at 5.  A May 2006 Gallup poll found that 54% of 
respondents felt that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable alternative 
lifestyle,” while 41% felt it should not.  Id. at 6.  And the percentage of people who 
believe that “homosexuality is a way of life that should be discouraged by society” has 
 
2006] MORAL CONFLICT AND LIBERTY 79 
know a gay person, however, or who say they have become 
more accepting of gays and lesbians over the past few years, 
has increased significantly over the past fifteen years.34   
Of particular note is the number of people who seem to 
have discovered gay people in their own families.  In a 1992 
Princeton Survey Research Associates (“PSRA”)/Newsweek poll, 
9% of respondents said that someone in their family was gay or 
lesbian, while 90% reported that there was no one in their 
family who was gay or lesbian.35  In 2000, 23% of respondents 
said that someone in their family was gay or lesbian, while only 
75% reported there was no one in their family who was gay or 
lesbian.36  Given that the number of gay people probably did 
not increase 14% between 1992 and 2000, one must presume 
that more gay people told their families about their sexual 
orientation during that time period.37   
Perhaps because of the greater familiarity that 
members of the American public are beginning to have with 
gay people (including their own family members), purging 
homosexuality from our society does not appear to be a huge 
priority for a significant segment of our public.  What is 
particularly interesting about Bowman’s polling compilation is 
the number of people who do not think homosexuality is a 
moral issue at all,38 and the significant percentage who do not 
  
remained below 50% (ranging from 41% to 45%) in responses to a PSRA/Pew Research 
Center survey in 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2004.  Id. at 8. 
 34 In a PSRA/Newsweek poll in 1985, only 22% of respondents said they had a 
“friend or close acquaintance” who was gay or lesbian.  Id. at 16.  In a 2000 
PSRA/Newsweek poll, 56% of respondents said they had a “friend or close 
acquaintance” who was gay or lesbian.  Id.  In a July 2003 Gallup poll, 32% of 
respondents indicated they had “become more accepting of gays and lesbians” over the 
past few years, 59% said their attitudes had not changed, and 8% said they had become 
less accepting.  Id. at 10. 
 35 BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 16.   
 36 Id.  
 37 Along the lines of increasing knowledge about gay family members, I have 
always appreciated Professor Nan Hunter’s idea of a “Thanksgiving Family Coming 
Out Day.”  Every Thanksgiving, every family with a gay member should tell another 
family about the gay family member.  If all families with a known gay member would 
adopt this tradition, my guess is that almost every person in America would end up 
knowing (or knowing of) one gay person within some number of years. 
 38 For example, in a February 2006 survey by PSRA/Pew Research Center, 
33% of respondents stated that “homosexual behavior” was “not a moral issue,” while 
12% called such behavior “acceptable.”  BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 4.  In the 
May 2006 Gallup question, in which respondents were given only the options of 
“homosexual behavior” being “morally wrong” or “morally acceptable,” 44% of 
respondents said it was morally acceptable.  Id.  It seems likely to me that the Pew 
data are more consistent with a significant segment of the public’s view—i.e., that 
homosexuality is not something to be agitated about (the second view of gay sex), but is 
also not something they would call “morally acceptable” (the third view of gay sex). 
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think it would matter that much if there was greater 
acceptance of gay people in society.  For example, in a 2003 
PSRA/Pew Research Center survey, respondents were asked 
the following question: “Do you think more acceptance of gays 
and lesbians would be a good thing or a bad thing for the 
country—or that it would not make much difference either 
way?”39  Only 31% of respondents said that more acceptance of 
gay people would be bad for the country.40  Twenty-three 
percent thought it would be good for the country and 42% felt it 
would not make much difference.41
To me, these various polls taken together indicate that 
there is a significant number of people (but substantially less 
than a strong majority of people) in this country who believe 
that homosexuality is morally problematic and that society 
must therefore do what it can to discourage, disapprove of and 
reduce the incidence of homosexual behavior.  These are the 
individuals whom I would consider to hold the first view of gay 
sex I describe above. There is also a much smaller group of 
people who believe that homosexuality is as morally acceptable 
as heterosexuality.  These are the individuals whom I would 
consider to hold the third view of gay sex I describe above. 
And, finally, there is a significant group of people in the 
middle. These people adhere to the second view of gay sex and 
therefore hold conflicting views about public policy and 
homosexuality.  They do not feel homosexuality is morally 
equivalent to heterosexuality and so they are not interested in 
conferring civil marriage on gay couples.42  But they also do not 
believe it would be terribly harmful for society if gay couples 
were acknowledged and permitted to have equal rights.43  
  
 39 Id. at 7. 
 40 Id.   
 41 Id.  A 2004 Harris/CNN/Time poll reflects similar indifference.  In that 
poll, respondents were asked whether they would be more or less likely to vote for a 
candidate who favored legalizing gay marriage, or whether it would make no 
difference.  Id. at 15.  Forty-eight percent of respondents said they would be less likely 
to vote for such a candidate, 10% said they would be more likely to vote for such a 
candidate, and 39% said it would make no difference to them.  Id. 
 42 Id. at 21-24 (noting various polls showing consistent 50% to 65% 
disapproval of marriage for same-sex couples when respondents are given the 
opportunity to note solely their approval or disapproval of marriage for same-sex 
couples). 
 43 For example, in a 2003 Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll, respondents were 
asked whether “allowing two people of the same sex to legally marry will change our 
society for the better, will it have no effect, or will it change our society for the worse?”  
Forty-eight percent thought it would change our society for the worse, 10% thought it 
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Thus, when given the choice between marriage or civil unions 
for same-sex couples, and no legal recognition for same-sex 
couples at all, support for “no legal recognition” never goes 
above 50% and, in most cases, hovers between 35% and 40%.44  
Conversely, when one combines the small public support for 
gay marriage with the more substantial support for civil 
unions, there is consistently a majority of support for some 
legal recognition of gay couples.45
What this means to me is that the second view of gay 
sex holds significant sway in our society today.  As I note 
above, I presume most parents today would prefer their child 
not be gay.  But if their child was gay, these parents may no 
longer believe they must desperately seek out professional 
“help” for the child. The large number of well-adjusted, happy 
and successful gay people living openly and honestly in today’s 
society reinforces the medical profession’s current judgment 
that there is nothing psychologically wrong with being gay.46  
  
would change our society for the better, and 40% thought it would have no effect on our 
society.  Id. at 25. 
 44 BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 27-28 (reviewing one poll from 2000, 
and fifteen polls from 2004, that gave respondents the option between marriage, civil 
unions, and no legal recognition for same-sex couples). 
 45 Id.  What is particularly fascinating is that people report more moral 
disapproval of homosexuality among the American public than the polls indicate there 
actually is.  A 2001 Gallup poll asked, “What is your impression of how most Americans 
feel about homosexual behavior—do most Americans think it is acceptable or not 
acceptable?”  Seventy-four percent responded that most Americans believe homosexual 
behavior is not acceptable, while 21% responded that most Americans believe 
homosexual behavior is acceptable.  Id. at 7.  In fact, a May 2001 Gallup poll found that 
40% of respondents considered “homosexual behavior” to be “morally acceptable,” while 
53% found it to be “morally wrong.”  Id. at 4.  And in the NORC survey of 2002, 55% 
said homosexual behavior was “always wrong” and 5% said it was “almost always” 
wrong; 33% said it was “not wrong” and 7% said it was “only sometimes” wrong.  Id. at 
2. 
 46 See, e.g., Amer. Psychiatric Ass’n, Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Issues, 
http://healthyminds.org/glbissues.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (quoting a 1992 
American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) statement: “Whereas homosexuality per se 
implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational 
capabilities, the [APA] calls on all international health organizations and individual 
psychiatrists in other countries, to urge the repeal in their own country of legislation 
that penalized homosexual acts by consenting adults in private. And further the APA 
calls on these organizations and individuals to do all that is possible to decrease the 
stigma related to homosexuality wherever and whenever it may occur.”); Amer. 
Psychological Ass’n, Being Gay Is Just as Healthy as Being Straight, 
http://www.psychologymatters.org/hooker.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006); Child 
Welfare League of America, LGBTQ Youth Issues: About the Program, 
http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/glbtqabout.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) 
(noting the Child Welfare League of America’s “full support for all young people, 
regardless of sexual orientation”); Child Welfare League of America, Position 
Statement on Parenting of Children by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults, 
http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/glbtqposition.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) 
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And more and more people are beginning to accept that 
individuals do not “choose” homosexuality; they are simply 
emotionally and physically happier with an individual of the 
same sex.47  It is also possible that the horror value of 
discovering one’s child is gay has subsided.  Although the 
majority of parents today may not want their child to be gay, 
they are probably less horrified to find out their child is gay 
than they would be if they discovered their child was having 
sex with his or her sibling, having sex with a child or having 
sex in public.   
And, at bottom, these parents do not want their children 
discriminated against “just because they are gay.”  Parents 
may not like the fact that their child is gay, but they also do 
not want American society to penalize their child unduly for 
that fact.48  
  
(“The Child Welfare League of America . . . affirms that lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
parents are as well suited to raise children as their heterosexual counterparts.”). 
 47 See, e.g., BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 19 (surveying relevant polls 
and concluding that “[o]ne of the most dramatic changes in attitudes about 
homosexuality appears to be about its cause.  More people than in the past say that 
people are born homosexual or that it is an orientation that they cannot change.  In a 
Gallup question from 1977, 12% said homosexuality was something a person was born 
with; in 2003, 38% gave that response.”). 
 48 What many of these people and their friends do, with regard to public 
policies, is engage in “moral bracketing.”  Moral bracketing, a basic component of 
liberal political theory, allows people to say both that homosexuality is wrong and that 
antigay discrimination is wrong.  Under this liberal view, as long as gay people do not 
harm anyone else, the State should be tolerant of them.  See Feldblum, Gay Is Good, 
supra note 17 at 147-50 (describing moral bracketing).  The advantages and 
disadvantages of moral bracketing have intrigued me for over a decade.  See generally 
Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING 
CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 149 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 
2000) [hereinafter Feldblum, Federal Gay Rights]; Chai R. Feldblum, The Limitations 
of Liberal Neutrality Arguments in Favour of Same-Sex Marriage, in LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andnæs eds., 2001); Feldblum, 
Moral Rhetoric, supra note 23; Chai R. Feldblum, A Progressive Moral Case for Same-
Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485 (1998); Feldblum, Sexual 
Orientation, supra note 20.  My personal belief is that we will be able to achieve full 
liberty for LGBT people only if we directly engage in a moral discourse about sexuality, 
sexual orientation, and gender in the public domain.  The Moral Values Project, an 
enterprise I began working on in 2005, is designed to reach people who believe 
homosexuality is immoral but who also believe gay people should not be discriminated 
against.  One goal of the Moral Values Project is to move people from the “I love you 
anyway” stance to the “I love you” stance—that is, from the second view of gay sex I 
describe above to the third view of gay sex.  For purposes of this article, however, I am 
postulating a trend towards more legal protection and equality for LGBT people, 
whether it is achieved through a continuation of moral bracketing (as some people 
believe it can be) or through a new engagement with moral discourse (as I believe is 
necessary). 
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For purposes of this article, therefore, I would like to 
postulate that the coming decades will see a rise in legislation 
and judicial opinions favoring full liberty for LGBT people. 
Assuming that is the case, how should the LGBT movement 
think about the fact that granting liberty to gay people might 
put a burden on people holding the first view of gay sex—
people who feel that if they rent an apartment to a gay couple, 
allow a gay couple to eat at their restaurant or provide health 
benefits to a same-sex spouse, it is tantamount to aiding and 
abetting sinful or immoral behavior? 
B. Impact of LGBT Liberty on Belief Liberty  
To consider the question I pose above as relevant at all, 
one has to believe that a civil rights law that protects the 
liberty of LGBT people by prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity (or by conferring civil 
union or marriage status on same-sex couples) places a burden 
on the liberty of some people regulated by the law.  This is not 
self-evident.  Many people believe these laws merely regulate 
the “conduct” of such individuals and have little or no impact 
on such individuals’ beliefs, identities or practices. 
The liberty I believe such laws might, in certain 
circumstances, burden is what I call “belief liberty.”49  What I 
mean by “burden” is that the law requires an individual to 
engage in conduct that requires him or her to act in a manner 
inconsistent with his or her deepest held beliefs.  From a 
liberty perspective, whether these beliefs stem from a religious 
source or from a secular source is irrelevant.  What is common 
among these belief systems, and what should be relevant for 
the liberty analysis, is that these beliefs form a core aspect of 
the individual’s sense of self and purpose in the world. 
Certainly, in America today, religious people of certain 
denominations are likely to be disproportionately burdened by 
laws that regulate their conduct with regard to gay people.  For 
example, current polling data shows that, while the majority of 
Americans (58%) say marriage for same-sex couples should not 
be permitted, a much larger 85% of self-identified conservative 
Republicans and evangelical, white Protestants say that gay 
  
 49 I explain what I mean by “belief liberty,” as well as what I consider 
“identity liberty” and “bodily liberty” infra Part B.2.a. 
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marriage should be illegal.50  But we miss the mark, I think, if 
we analyze this burden solely as a burden on religious liberty, 
writ narrow, rather than as a burden on belief liberty, writ 
large.  Obviously, as I note in the introduction to this article, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith51 limits the reach of the Free Exercise Clause as a 
practical matter.  But, as a theoretical matter, I believe it is 
more appropriate to analyze these belief claims as liberty 
claims and not to elevate religious beliefs over other deeply 
held beliefs derived from non-religious sources.  From the 
perspective of a person holding a particular belief, the intensity 
of that belief may be as strong regardless of whether it derives 
from a religious or a non-religious source.  
Fully recognizing the existence of this type of burden 
requires two steps.  First, we must consider what moral values 
are inherent in civil rights laws and whether these values 
might conflict with the deeply held beliefs of some individuals 
who are regulated by the law.  Second, we must consider 
whether forcing someone to act (or not to act) in a certain way 
can burden a liberty interest that should be protected under 
the Due Process Clause. 
1. The Moral Values in Civil Rights Laws 
A major strand of liberal political theory postulates that 
“morality”—in the sense of a moral, normative view of “the 
good”—is not the proper object of governmental action.  
According to this view, individuals living in a pluralist society 
will inevitably hold divergent normative and moral beliefs, and 
the role of law and government is to adequately safeguard the 
rights necessary for each individual to pursue his or her own 
normative view of “the good life”—not to affirmatively advance 
one moral view of “the good” over others.52
  
 50 Gary Langer, Most Oppose Gay Marriage; Fewer Back an Amendment, 
ABC NEWS, June 5, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Politics/story?id=2041689 
&page=1. 
 51 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that “the right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that 
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 
n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
 52 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 349-78 
(1980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977); JOHN RAWLS, The 
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 173, 173-211 (1996).  
See generally Feldblum, Gay Is Good, supra note 17, at 143-50 (describing liberal 
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In a recent short comment on why government should 
not be involved in recognizing any marriages (for either same-
sex couples or opposite-sex couples), Tamara Metz nicely 
captures this viewpoint.  Metz posits that the goal of marriage 
as an institution is to have a couple’s relationship supported by 
an ethical authority outside the couple itself.  And the “liberal 
state,” argues Metz, is “ill suited to serve as an ethical 
authority.”53  Why?  As Metz explains:  “Ideally, the liberal 
state is relatively distant, more legal than moral, and more 
neutral than not among competing worldviews so as to protect 
individual freedom and diversity.”54
I do not disagree that a liberal state must have, as its 
highest priority, the protection of pluralist ways of living 
among its citizens, subject to such ways of living not harming 
others in society.  My argument is simply that when 
government decides, through the enactment of its laws, that a 
certain way of life does not harm those living that life and does 
not harm others exposed to such individuals, the government is 
necessarily staking out a position of moral neutrality with 
regard to that way of living.  And that position of moral 
neutrality may stand in stark contrast to those who believe 
that the particular way of living at issue is morally laden and 
problematic. 
I have both documented and personally watched as 
supporters of a gay civil rights bill have gone to great lengths 
to argue that they are not taking a position on the morality of 
homosexuality or bisexuality by supporting such a law.55  I 
agree that supporting such a law does not necessarily convey a 
message that “gay is good.”  But it is disingenuous to say that 
voting for a law of this kind conveys no message about morality 
at all. The only way to justify prohibiting private employers, 
landlords and business owners from discriminating against gay 
people is to make the prior moral assessment that acting on 
one’s homosexual orientation is not so morally problematic as 
  
neutrality approach);  Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, supra note 20, at 245-46 (same).  
Carlos Ball has written extensively on liberal neutrality in the context of gay rights.  
See CARLOS BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS (2002). 
 53 Tamara Metz, Why We Should Disestablish Marriage, in MARY LYNDON 
SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE 99, 101 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004). 
 54 Id. at 102. 
 55 See, e.g., Feldblum, Federal Gay Rights, supra note 48 (documenting moral 
bracketing throughout introduction of recurring gay rights bills); Feldblum, Moral 
Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 996-1004 (deconstructing moral bracketing done by various 
Members of Congress during a hearing on ENDA). 
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to justify private parties discriminating against such 
individuals in the public domain.  To return to the three 
possible views of gay sex, supporting a law that prohibits 
discrimination based on sexual orientation requires that the 
supporter hold, at a minimum, the second view of gay sex—
even though it does not require that the supporter hold the 
third view.  
For example, we do not have laws today that protect 
those who engage in pedophilia or domestic violence from 
employment, housing or public accommodation discrimination.  
We do not ask about these groups of individuals: “Well, but can 
they type?  Can they do the job?”  I do not believe the lack of 
such laws is due solely to the lack of an adequate “pedophile 
lobby” or “domestic violence abuser lobby.”  Rather, I believe 
society (as reflected in its government’s public policy) has 
determined that actions of this kind hurt others and are thus 
morally problematic.  For that reason, a private actor who uses 
the fact that an individual has engaged in these actions as 
grounds for exclusion is not viewed as engaging in unjustified 
discrimination.  
This analysis works equally well to explain and describe 
the status quo in which LGBT people currently remain 
vulnerable to private and public discrimination.  When the 
government fails to pass a law prohibiting non-discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation, in the face of documentation 
that such discrimination occurs on a regular basis, or fails to 
allow same-sex couples access to civil marriage when the 
practical need for that access has been documented for scores of 
families, the government is similarly taking a position on a 
moral question.  The State has decided that a homosexual or 
bisexual orientation is not morally neutral, but rather may 
legitimately be viewed by some as morally problematic.  It is 
precisely that determination which permits legislators to 
continue denying full liberty to those who act on their 
homosexual or bisexual orientations and who are open and 
honest about their actions. 
In these cases, the issue is often framed as a question of 
“equality.”  That is certainly true.  The existence of civil rights 
laws, as well as the absence of such laws, will determine how 
much equality LGBT people enjoy in our society.  But let us be 
clear: the fact that this is a question of equality should not 
obscure the fact that this is also a question of morality.  And 
that is because moral beliefs necessarily underlie the 
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assessment of whether such equality is justifiably granted or 
denied. 
Once we acknowledge these moral assessments, it 
becomes easier to understand that a civil rights law prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation might be shocking 
for some members of society.  For those who believe that a 
homosexual or bisexual orientation is not morally neutral, and 
that an individual who acts on his or her homosexual 
orientation acts in a sinful or harmful manner (to himself or 
herself and to others), it is problematic when the government 
passes a law that gives such individuals equal access to all 
societal institutions.  Such a law rests on a moral assessment of 
homosexuality and bisexuality that is radically different from 
their own.  Such a law presumes the moral neutrality of 
homosexuality and bisexuality, while those who oppose the law 
believe homosexuality and bisexuality are morally problematic.   
Conversely, for those who believe that any sexual 
orientation, including a homosexual or bisexual orientation, is 
morally neutral, and that an individual who acts on his or her 
homosexual or bisexual orientation acts in an honest and good 
manner, it is problematic when the government fails to pass 
laws providing equality to such individuals.  The failure to pass 
such a law rests on a moral assessment of homosexuality and 
bisexuality that is radically different from their own.  Such 
failure presumes homosexuality and bisexuality are morally 
problematic, while those who desire the law believe 
homosexuality and bisexuality are morally neutral.  
Given this reality, we are in a zero-sum game: a gain for 
one side necessarily entails a corresponding loss for the other 
side. 
This is why then-Professor (now Judge) Michael 
McConnell is correct to observe that disputes surrounding 
sexual orientation “feature a seemingly irreconcilable clash 
between those who believe that homosexual conduct is immoral 
and those who believe that it is a natural and morally 
unobjectionable manifestation of human sexuality.”56  
McConnell believes that the debate over sexual orientation is 
best approached by the government extending respect to both 
of these positions, without taking sides on either position.  
  
 56 See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2000). 
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Thus, using an analogy to the respect people seek from 
government for their religious beliefs, he urges the following: 
The starting point would be to extend respect to both sides in the 
conflict of opinion, to treat both the view that homosexuality is a 
healthy and normal manifestation of human sexuality and the view 
that homosexuality is unnatural and immoral as conscientious 
positions, worthy of respect, much as we treat both atheism and 
faith as worthy of respect.  In using the term “respect,” I do not mean 
agreement.  Rather, I mean the civil toleration we extend to fellow 
citizens and fellow human beings even when we disagree with their 
views. We should recognize that the “Civil Magistrate” is no more 
“competent a Judge” of the “Truth” about human sexuality than 
about religion.57
But what McConnell fails to appreciate in his analysis is 
the zero-sum nature of the game.  That is, he fails to recognize 
that the government is necessarily taking a stance on the moral 
question every time it fails to affirmatively ensure that gay 
people can live openly, safely and honestly in society. 
Note, for example, how McConnell characterizes 
possible governmental actions (and inactions) under his 
recommended approach: 
Under this approach, the state should not impose a penalty on 
practices associated with or compelled by any of the various views of 
homosexuality, and should refrain from using its power to favor, 
promote, or advance one position over the other.  The difference 
between a “gay rights” position and a “First Amendment” approach 
is that the former adopts as its governing principle the idea that 
homosexuality is normal, natural, and morally unobjectionable, 
while the latter takes the view that the moral issue is not for the 
government to decide.  Thus, the government would not punish 
sexual acts by consenting gay individuals, nor would it use sexual 
orientation as a basis for classification or discrimination, without 
powerful reasons, not grounded in moral objections, for taking such 
action.  On the other hand, the government would not attempt to 
project this posture of moral neutrality onto the private sphere, but 
would allow private forces in the culture to determine the ultimate 
social response.58  
  
 57 Id. at 44. 
 58 Id. (emphasis added).  As McConnell concludes: 
Such an approach would produce many of the same advantages for this 
cultural conflict that the First Amendment produces for religious conflict.  
This approach would provide the basis for civic peace on an issue where the 
nation is dangerously divided, it would provide maximum respect for 
individual conscience, it would depoliticize an issue that many of us believe is 
private and not political in character, and it would help to restore the public-
private distinction. 
 
2006] MORAL CONFLICT AND LIBERTY 89 
It seems apparent from McConnell’s writing (although, 
for some reason, he fails to state so explicitly) that the “gay 
rights” position is one that calls for government intervention in 
the private sector through laws that make discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation illegal or that make civil 
marriage available to same-sex couples.  I gather that is what 
McConnell is referring to by the government “project[ing] this 
posture of moral neutrality onto the private sphere.”59
But if that is the case, McConnell is simply wrong to 
assume that a government’s failure to pass such laws rests on 
the view “that the moral issue is not for the government to 
decide.”  The government is taking a position on the moral 
question when it fails to extend access to civil marriage to 
same-sex couples.  It is precisely because some people hold the 
view that homosexuality is immoral that gay people have been 
denied equal protection under the law up until this point.  
Government has not simply been sitting on the sidelines of 
these moral questions during all the time it has failed to pass 
laws protecting the liberty of LGBT people.  Government has 
quite clearly been taking a side—and it has not been taking the 
side that helps gay people. 
McConnell correctly diagnoses the opposing moral 
viewpoints, but his proposed solution is no more satisfying than 
the solutions proposed by gay rights leaders who characterize 
gay civil rights laws as simple “neutral” prescriptions of 
equality that have no impact on a person’s religious or moral 
beliefs.  Both McConnell and these gay rights leaders are 
trying to deal with the conflict by simply wishing it away.  That 
is neither possible nor intellectually honest.   
2. The Burden on Liberty 
Passage of a law based on a moral assessment different 
from one’s own can certainly make an individual feel alienated 
from his or her government and fellow citizens.  But that is a 
far cry from accepting that such a law burdens one’s liberty in 
a way that might require further justification by the State.  I 
might disagree with my government’s foreign policy or 
economic policy and think on some days that I would be 
happier living in some other country.  But without something 
  
Id. at 44-45. 
 59 Id. at 44. 
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more, it is hard to argue that my liberty—even something as 
broad as my “belief liberty”—has been burdened. 
The “something more,” from my perspective, is a legal 
requirement that an individual act, or refrain from acting, in a 
manner that the individual can credibly claim undermines his 
or her core beliefs and sense of self.  Without such a trigger, a 
claim that one’s liberty has been burdened cannot legitimately 
be maintained.  Explicating this point requires a discussion of 
both belief liberty and the interaction between conduct and 
belief. 
a. Three Forms of Liberty 
It is way past time to get over the Lochner era’s60 
baggage and embrace the full scope of our Due Process Clause’s 
liberty interest.  Numerous scholars over the past thirty years 
have produced compelling and thoughtful analyses of the 
liberty interest embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.61  My goal in this section is more limited.  I want 
to focus on Justice David Souter’s comprehensive and 
historically far-reaching concurrence in Washington v. 
Glucksberg62 and suggest that we apply the lessons of that 
concurrence to thinking about belief liberty more generally. 
In his Glucksberg concurrence, Justice Souter is clear 
that he believes the Lochner line of cases was incorrectly 
decided.  But that is not because a person’s “right to choose a 
calling” is not an essential “element of liberty.”63  Rather, it is 
because the Court’s decisions in the Lochner line of cases 
“harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist 
  
 60 The era was named after the substantive due process case of Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 61 For just a small sample, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the 
New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2002); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental 
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004) [hereinafter 
Tribe, Lawrence]; Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441 (1992). 
 62 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 63 Id. at 759 (noting that the standard of reasonableness or arbitrariness 
under the Due Process Clause is “fairly traceable to Justice Bradley’s dissent in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, in which he said that a person’s right to choose a calling was 
an element of liberty . . . and declared that the liberty and property protected by due 
process are not truly recognized if such rights may be ‘arbitrarily assailed’” (citation 
omitted)). 
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implementation of the standard they espoused.”64  In other 
words, it is not that living and working where one wills is not 
an essential part of liberty.  But the government must have the 
ability to regulate that liberty in a reasonable manner in order 
to carry out its important interests.65  The Court’s failure in the 
Lochner line of cases was its failure to properly judge and apply 
the government’s important interest in protecting the social 
and economic welfare of its citizens.  It was not a failure in 
judging the importance of work as an element of liberty.66
Justice Souter’s main priority in his Glucksberg 
concurrence, however, is not to revive the importance of 
contract as a liberty interest.  His main objective is to attack 
the Court’s approach, over the past fifty years, of focusing 
almost exclusively on whether a proclaimed liberty interest is a 
“fundamental right,” and then almost invariably invalidating 
any legislation burdening such a right.  To Justice Souter, this 
approach not only represents a wrong turn from earlier 
substantive due process jurisprudence, but it also elides the 
key point that liberty interests naturally fall across a 
spectrum.  Thus, many interests can be “liberty” interests and 
still be justifiably burdened by the government because of the 
needs of society.67
  
 64 Id. at 761.  Justice Souter begins his historical overview by reminding us 
that one of the first instances in which the Court applied the Due Process Clause was 
“the case that the [Fourteenth] Amendment would in due course overturn, Dred Scott 
v. Sandford.”  Id. at 758 (citation omitted).  
 65 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court said that 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes  
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be 
free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his 
livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for 
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and 
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above 
mentioned. 
Id. at 589.  Justice Souter’s observation of Allgeyer is the following: “Although this 
principle was unobjectionable, what followed for a season was, in the realm of economic 
legislation, the echo of Dred Scott.”  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., 
concurring).   
 66 While the ability to pursue one’s calling can fall within the identity liberty 
I describe below, one must admit that the Court’s assessment that one needs perfect 
economic freedom in doing so (including the freedom to agree to wretched work 
conditions), see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59-61 (1905), was yet another 
failing of reasoning in many of the Lochner-era cases. 
 67 Scholars have correctly pointed out that the opinion authored by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), focused on a similar liberty spectrum.  See, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 21, 33 (2003).  Barnett notes that the discussion of the liberty right in 
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Justice Souter finds guidance for this approach in 
Justice Harlan’s dissent from dismissal on jurisdictional 
grounds in Poe v. Ullman: 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.  This “liberty” is 
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of 
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep 
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and so on.  It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes, 
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain 
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs 
asserted to justify their abridgment.68
For Justice Souter, the type of interests that would 
require particularly careful scrutiny would presumably be 
those described in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, an opinion written jointly by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter: 
These matters [personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education], 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.69  
  
Casey is commonly attributed to Justice Kennedy.  Id.  Assuming that is true, there are 
two Justices on the current court, Justices Kennedy and Souter, who appear to be 
deeply invested in a flexible liberty analysis.  See Post, supra note 61, at 85-96 (noting 
flexibility in the early evolution of modern substantive due process and describing the 
rigidity articulated by the Glucksberg majority). 
 68 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).  Justice Souter begins his substantive analysis in his Glucksberg concurrence 
as follows: 
My understanding of unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and 
subsequent cases avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without 
embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice 
described at a very specific level.  That understanding begins with a concept 
of “ordered liberty,” comprising a continuum of rights to be free from 
“arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.” 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Poe, 
367 U.S. at 543, 549). 
 69 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.  
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Drawing from a historical overview of substantive due 
process cases and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe, Justice 
Souter articulates two basic guidelines for courts engaging in a 
substantive due process analysis.  First, a court “is bound to 
confine the values that it recognizes to those truly deserving 
constitutional stature”70—an approach that enables a court to 
avoid engaging in piercing scrutiny of every conceivable burden 
on liberty that may arise across the spectrum.71  Second, a 
court may not intervene “merely to identify a reasonable 
resolution of contending values that differs from the terms of 
the legislation under review.”72  As Justice Souter articulates 
the standard,  
It is only when the legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued, 
is so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as to 
be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give way.  
Only if this standard points against the statute can the individual 
claimant be said to have a constitutional right.73  
In an interesting (strategic?) move, Justice Souter never 
directly repudiates the strict scrutiny standard requiring that 
governmental restrictions on fundamental rights be narrowly 
tailored to fit a compelling government interest.  Indeed, he 
repeats that standard in various citations in his concurrence.74  
  
 70 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 71 As Justice Souter put it:  
Justice Harlan thus recognized just what the Court today assumes, that by 
insisting on a threshold requirement that the interest (or, as the Court puts 
it, the right) be fundamental before anything more than rational basis 
justification is required, the Court ensures that not every case will require 
the “complex balancing” that heightened scrutiny entails. 
Id. at 767 n.9. 
 72 Id. at 768. 
 73 Id.  In a footnote to this sentence, Justice Souter observed,  
Our cases have used various terms to refer to fundamental liberty interests, 
and at times we have also called such an interest a “right” even before 
balancing it against the government’s interest.  Precision in terminology, 
however, favors reserving the label “right” for instances in which the 
individual’s liberty interest actually trumps the government’s countervailing 
interests; only then does the individual have anything legally enforceable as 
against the state’s attempt at regulation. 
Id. at 768 n.10 (citations omitted). 
 74 Justice Souter wrote: 
The claims of arbitrariness that mark almost all instances of unenumerated 
substantive rights are those resting on “certain interests requir[ing] 
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment[,] [c]f. Skinner v. Oklahoma [ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 
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But his emphasis that a court must consider whether a 
“legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued” is 
“commensurate with the individual interest”75 appears clearly 
designed to argue that a court has flexibility in its substantive 
due process analysis.  That is, in order to be true to what 
Justice Souter sees as the spirit and design of the 
constitutional protection of liberty, while at the same time 
ensuring that government is able to regulate effectively in a 
complex world, he calls for an almost dialectical valuation of 
the government’s interest against the particular liberty 
interest at stake.76   
Of course, Justice Souter’s opinion in Glucksberg was a 
concurrence, and Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion offers a 
very different view of substantive due process.  Under the 
majority approach in Glucksberg, there are a limited number of 
“fundamental rights” that can be clearly named and found, 
based on objective, historical facts, to be rooted in our nation’s 
tradition.77  With regard to legislative burdens on this very 
limited set of “fundamental rights,” courts will apply strict 
  
(1942)]; Bolling v. Sharpe, [347 U.S. 497 (1954)],” [Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)]; that is, interests in liberty 
sufficiently important to be judged “fundamental,” id., at 548; see also id., at 
541 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380 (CC ED Pa. 1825)).  In 
the face of an interest this powerful a State may not rest on threshold 
rationality or a presumption of constitutionality, but may prevail only on the 
ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the 
reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted.  Poe, supra, at 
548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (an “enactment involv[ing] . . . a most 
fundamental aspect of ‘liberty’ . . . [is] subjec[t] to ‘strict scrutiny’”) (quoting 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S., at 541); Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (reaffirming that due process “forbids the government 
to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests . . . unless the infringement 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”).   
Id. at 766-67 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
 75 Id. at 768 (emphasis added). 
 76 As Justice Souter put it:  
Skinner, that is, added decisions regarding procreation to the list of liberties 
recognized in Meyer and Pierce and loosely suggested, as a gloss on their 
standard of arbitrariness, a judicial obligation to scrutinize any impingement 
on such an important interest with heightened care.  In so doing, it suggested 
a point that Justice Harlan would develop, that the kind and degree of 
justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on 
the importance of the interest being asserted by the individual. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 543).  See 
also id. at 767 (stating that a court is “to assess the relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the 
contending interests”).  
 77 See id. at 719-28 (majority opinion). 
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scrutiny (not dialectical balancing) and will almost invariably 
invalidate the legislative burden.78   
But the Supreme Court’s deployment of a liberty 
analysis to invalidate Texas’ sodomy law in Lawrence v. Texas79 
opened the door to a revival of Justice Souter’s more capacious 
understanding of substantive due process.  Professor Robert 
Post observes that Justice Kennedy’s “extravagant and 
passionate” opinion in Lawrence “simply shatters, with all the 
heartfelt urgency of deep conviction, the paralyzing carapace in 
which Glucksberg had sought to encase substantive due 
process.”80  And Professor Larry Tribe notes that the 
“Glucksberg gambit” to “collapse claims of liberty into the 
unidimensional and binary business of determining which 
personal activities belong to the historically venerated 
catalogue of privileged acts and which do not” could well have 
succeeded, had future cases followed its trajectory.81  Instead, 
as Tribe notes, even the briefest examination of the Lawrence 
opinion makes plain that the Court steadfastly resisted a 
“reductionist procedure” that reduces the liberty interest to 
“flattened-out collections of private acts.”82
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence 
triggered a revival of writing on liberty, some of it from people 
who had been writing and thinking about liberty for a long 
time.  In a sweeping and eloquent article, Professor Larry Tribe 
revives his theory that the “essence of freedom” is “the self-
governing experience of making, expressing, and renewing 
one’s commitments, all the way from one’s choices with respect 
to intimate relationships to one’s choices as a participating 
member of a self-governing polity.”83  Tribe’s theory is premised 
on an “understanding of self-government and relational rights 
as defining the core of liberty,” and on the “recognition of 
coercion, and of using others as mere means to the 
  
 78 Id.  For fascinating and excellent analyses of the development of 
substantive due process, and the effort by the Glucksberg majority to radically change 
the trajectory of that development, see Post, supra note 61, at 86-96 and Tribe, 
Lawrence, supra note 61, at 1921-25. 
 79 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 80 Post, supra note 61, at 96. 
 81 Tribe, Lawrence, supra note 61, at 1924-25. 
 82 Id. at 1931-32. 
 83 Id. at 1941. 
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maximization of one’s own ends, as setting the limit to liberty’s 
reach.”84   
Professor Robert Post, who explored pre-New Deal 
substantive due process in several articles,85 argues that the 
“[t]hemes of respect and stigma . . . at the moral center of the 
Lawrence opinion” offer an entirely new dimension to 
substantive due process analysis.86  Post speculates that this 
new approach may result in courts using the power of the Due 
Process Clause to “prohibit[] the state from stigmatizing or 
demeaning the private lives of persons.”87  And Professor 
Randy Barnett argues that the Lawrence opinion finally breaks 
the post-New Deal presumption of constitutionality for any 
government regulation other than that of a “fundamental 
right,” and substitutes a “presumption of liberty,” which 
requires some justification by the government for any 
restriction it places on liberty.88
Professor Nan Hunter was one of the first scholars to 
explicitly connect the Court’s analysis in Lawrence with Justice 
Souter’s concurrence in Glucksberg, and to suggest that 
Lawrence may “mark[] the beginning of a substantive due 
process jurisprudence that examines negative liberty limits on 
state power before, or instead of, articulating a specific 
standard of review.”89  In her analysis, Hunter does not 
speculate on whether she thinks this is a positive development 
for liberty jurisprudence; she is agnostic on that question.  I 
have noted elsewhere that I believe Hunter is correct with 
  
 84 Id. at 1943.  Tribe describes how, in a series of articles written in the 
1970s, he 
sketched a theory of why human relationships beyond the purely 
instrumental—and the expressive dimensions and mutual commitments they 
entail—are indispensable to the process of transmitting and transmuting 
values in an intergenerational, cross-social progression that keeps faith with 
a starting set of basic democratic undertakings while remaining open to 
evolution in the direction of greater empathy, inclusion, and respect. 
Id. at 1940-41. 
 85 See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in 
the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489 (1998); Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft 
Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513 (2002). 
 86 Post,  supra note 61, at 97-98. 
 87 Id. at 98. 
 88 Barnett, supra note 67, at 35-36 (citation omitted).  Barnett carefully 
distinguishes between “liberty,” which he defines as “the properly defined exercise of 
freedom” which “is and always has been constrained by the rights of others” and 
“license,” which is not limited by the rights of others and is therefore not a right at all.  
Id. at 37. 
 89 Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2004). 
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regard to her prediction of how the Court may proceed with 
substantive due process analyses in the future.90  But my point 
here is to argue that Justice Souter’s approach is also the 
appropriate one for the Court to adopt.   
I recognize that some might view Justice Souter’s 
approach as a death knell for important fundamental rights, 
while others may view it simply as a necessary correction to 
earlier substantive due process jurisprudence.  But on its 
merits, Justice Souter’s approach seems to me to properly 
reflect the reality of our complex society while staying 
consistent with the plain meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Governmental laws constantly burden liberty, 
and to decide that only ones that cross a magic line called 
“fundamental rights” should ever gain redress seems rigid and 
inappropriate.  Justice Souter’s approach permits courts to 
recognize realistically and honestly the myriad ways in which 
laws might burden the liberty interests of those subject to the 
laws, while not necessarily invalidating the laws. 
In 2002, Professor Rebecca Brown offered a 
comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the liberty 
interest embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
complete with a vigorous defense of the courts’ responsibility to 
protect such liberty, an explanation of how such judicial review 
is consistent with, not destructive of, democracy and a 
framework for considering liberty claims.91  In explaining why 
protecting liberty interests is as important a constitutional goal 
as protecting equality interests, Brown observed: 
[I]n a world of increasingly diverse personal and moral values, 
supporting very different notions of the good life, the communion of 
interests between representatives and represented can degrade even 
when laws nominally operate evenhandedly.  For example, laws that 
provide that “no one may [blank]” can exploit difference as effectively 
as a classification, when the blank is an activity that “we,” the 
  
 90 Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: 
What Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
115, 120 (2006) [hereinafter Feldblum, Right to Define] (describing liberty analysis in 
Lawrence).  See also Chai Feldblum, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Comments 
at From Griswold to Lawrence and Beyond: The Battle over Personal Privacy and the 
New Supreme Court (Mar. 2, 2006) (transcript available at http://pewforum.org/ 
events/index.php?EventID=95). 
 91 See Rebecca Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 
(2002). 
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political ins, have no wish to do, but that “they,” the outs, claim a 
profound need to do in pursuit of personal fulfillment.92
Brown uses laws prohibiting sodomy or assisted suicide 
as principal examples of the need to question a legislature’s 
reasons for burdening liberty.93  But the same framework that 
Brown proffers to scrutinize such prohibitions should apply as 
well to a legislature’s prohibition of discriminatory conduct 
that might adversely impact a regulated person’s liberty.  The 
fact that we might need to be concerned in the coming decades 
with the potential liberty burdens imposed by a sexual 
orientation anti-discrimination law or a marriage equality law 
(rather than with the liberty burdens posed by a criminal 
sodomy law or a law that excludes same-sex couples from civil 
marriage) simply reflects the reality that moral values are 
beginning to shift in this country—as I believe they should.  
Finally, in thinking about the type of liberties that rise 
to the level of requiring more searching government 
justification, I believe it is helpful to group the spectrum of 
liberty interests into three broad categories: bodily liberty, 
identity liberty and belief liberty.  There is nothing magical 
about these categories, and I do not contend they are the only 
ones that make sense.  But I believe this three-part 
categorization is an intellectually coherent manner in which to 
think about the spectrum of liberty interests that the Supreme 
Court has protected over the decades.94   
Bodily liberty is the easiest one to describe: the State 
should not invade the integrity of our bodies without a good 
  
 92 Id. at 1498.   
 93 Id. at 1545-49. 
 94 This categorization also permits us to think more logically about whether 
such liberties are inherently and solely negative liberties that prohibit the government 
from restraining some action on our parts, or whether they are also inherently positive 
liberties that require some affirmative action on the part of the government to allow for 
their full expression.  Obviously, the Supreme Court, for the moment, has come down 
clearly on the side that the liberty protected by the substantive Due Process Clause is 
solely a negative liberty.  See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).  But in many circumstances, the only way to achieve real 
liberty for some individuals will be for the government to take affirmative steps to 
bring about that liberty—even if such steps might then interfere with the liberty of 
others.  See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 6-7 (2003) 
(describing the need for government to affirmatively support the ability of individuals 
to give and receive care and to feel safe); Feldblum, Right to Define, supra note 90, at 
127-39 (noting affirmative steps government should take to protect the liberty of 
intersex and transgender people); West, supra note 61, passim (describing affirmative 
steps to be taken by government to ensure the liberty of women). 
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reason for doing so.95  Protecting members of the public from 
contagious diseases is a good reason to force someone to have 
his body invaded through a vaccination; fighting drug crime is 
not a good enough reason to force someone to vomit by 
pumping an emetic solution through a tube into his stomach.96
Identity liberty is the term I would use to describe the 
liberty that the Casey plurality sought to capture in its 
“mystery of human life” description, a description repeated by 
Justice Kennedy in the Lawrence majority: 
These matters [personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education], 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.97  
Despite Justice Scalia’s scoffing at this description as 
meaningless for purposes of law,98 I think it accurately 
captures a set of liberty interests that go to the core of a 
person’s identity.  This may be a person’s identity as a parent 
(including the decisions whether to have a child and how to 
raise the child), a person’s identity as a spouse or a lover 
(deciding what form of sexual intimacy one wishes to engage 
in), a person’s racial, ethnic, or religious identity or a person’s 
gender identity.  As I have previously observed: 
Not that many personal decisions rise to the level of “defin[ing] one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
  
 95 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 96 Compare Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27 (holding compulsory vaccination 
within police powers), with Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-74 (holding unconstitutional the 
forcible administration of emetic solution to induce vomiting in course of drug 
investigation). 
 97 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  See also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (relying on and quoting Casey when 
finding unconstitutional laws criminalizing consensual homosexual sex).   
 98 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And if the Court is 
referring not to the holding of Casey, but to the dictum of its famed sweet-mystery-of-
life passage (‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, 
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life’): That ‘casts some doubt’ 
upon either the totality of our jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer) 
nothing at all.  I have never heard of a law that attempted to restrict one’s ‘right to 
define’ certain concepts; and if the passage calls into question the government’s power 
to regulate actions based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of existence, etc.,’ it is the 
passage that ate the rule of law.”). 
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mystery of human life.”  We should not let the lofty rhetoric mislead 
us to the conclusion that these words can mean everything and 
anything.  They do not.  The examples provided by the Lawrence 
majority give meaning to the type of personal decisions at play 
here—the choice to marry, the choice to have a child (or not have a 
child), the choice to have sexual intimacy with a partner, the choice 
to raise a child in a certain fashion.  These are not small decisions.  
These are those big decisions in life that go to the core, essential 
aspects of our selves.99
Moreover, while the phrasing of the “mystery of human 
life” sentence reflects a twenty-first century language of human 
self-awareness, a similar sentiment regarding the importance 
of self-identity seems to underlie one of the Court’s earliest 
descriptions of the liberty interest, in Meyer v. Nebraska:  
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration 
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without 
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also 
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to 
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.100   
What was recognized at common law as essential to the 
“orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”101 is no doubt 
different from what would be recognized as such today.  But 
the underlying objective of the standard is the same—
identifying an area of core identity liberty for which the 
government needs a good reason if it is going to infringe on 
such identity. 
Finally, I use the category belief liberty to refer to one’s 
liberty to possess deeply held personal beliefs without coercion 
or penalty by the State.  Belief liberty presumably could be 
subsumed under identity liberty, since our beliefs are very 
often constitutive of our identities.  But I believe it is worth 
identifying this type of liberty separately because it is so often 
conflated with First Amendment rights to free speech, free 
expression and free exercise of religion.  That conflation is 
  
 99 Feldblum, Right to Define, supra note 90, at 139.  Larry Tribe’s project on 
liberty, with its focus on self-government and relational rights, captures incredibly well 
what I call identity liberty.  Tribe, Lawrence, supra note 61, at 1941-44. 
 100 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added). 
 101 Id. 
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understandable; most cases dealing with “beliefs” naturally 
arise under the First Amendment.  But is it necessary that 
such beliefs be protected solely under the First Amendment?  
Certainly, the ability to believe what one will seems “essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and 
women].”102  
The First Amendment right to free speech necessarily 
protects any speech, no matter how trivial. The First 
Amendment right to free exercise necessarily protects (within 
the limits of current Supreme Court doctrine) any religious 
belief, no matter how trivial.  By contrast, I believe it is 
appropriate that the belief liberty protected under the Due 
Process Clause be limited to those beliefs that occupy a position 
of significant importance to the individual.  Even if those 
beliefs are not so constitutive of the person’s identity as to be 
protected under “identity liberty,” the “mystery of human life” 
description of identity liberty can offer us guidance regarding 
what type of beliefs demand more searching scrutiny when a 
burden on such beliefs is alleged.   
Obviously, we all have many beliefs.  If the government 
had to justify every burden on every belief caused by every law, 
it would presumably have little time to do anything else.  But, 
certainly, we are capable of placing these beliefs in some sort of 
hierarchy.  For example, I believe that heterosexuality and 
homosexuality are morally neutral characteristics (similar to 
having red hair or brown hair), and I believe that acting 
consistently with one’s sexual orientation is a morally good act.  
I also believe that flowers are necessary to happiness and that 
Star Trek is a great contribution to our culture.  But I would 
rank my beliefs regarding sexuality as much more significant 
to my sense of self than my beliefs regarding flowers or Star 
Trek.  Thus, in order for belief liberty to be situated at a point 
in the spectrum that requires greater government justification 
for infringement, such beliefs must constitute an important 
core aspect of the individual.103  
  
 102 Id.   
 103 As Justice Souter was at pains to argue in his concurrence, “the kind and 
degree of justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on 
the importance of the interest being asserted by the individual.”  Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  See also id. at 767 (“[A] court [is] to 
assess the relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the contending interests . . . .”).  There is no 
reason to presume that this same analysis could not be applied to the relative weights 
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Analyzing belief liberty under the Due Process Clause 
(and not simply under the First Amendment) serves an 
additional useful purpose.  An individual’s deeply held beliefs 
may derive from religious sources, from purely secular sources 
or from spiritual sources that are not traditionally viewed as 
religious.  If these beliefs are an integral part of the person’s 
sense of self, my argument is that they constitute belief liberty.  
The particular source of the individual’s beliefs is not the 
barometer of their importance for due process purposes.  For 
belief liberty, the source of the beliefs (be it faith in God, belief 
in spiritual energy or a conviction of the rational five senses) 
has no relevance.  A belief derived from a religious faith should 
be accorded no more weight—and no less weight—than a belief 
derived from a non-religious source.   
As the Supreme Court reflected on a somewhat related 
question in 1944: 
If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a 
broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted 
that any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be 
given higher place than the others.  All have preferred position in 
our basic scheme.  All are interwoven there together.  Differences 
there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise.  
But they have unity in the charter’s prime place because they have 
unity in their human sources and functionings.  Heart and mind are 
not identical.  Intuitive faith and reasoned judgment are not the 
same.  Spirit is not always thought.  But in the everyday business of 
living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of personality find 
inseparable expression in a thousand ways.  They cannot be 
altogether parted in law more than in life.104
b. Burdening Belief by Regulating Conduct 
To understand the burden that an LGBT equality law 
might place on some people’s belief liberty, one must start by 
acknowledging that a State necessarily takes a position of 
moral neutrality on sexual orientation when it passes such a 
law.  For that reason, the logical underpinning of such a law 
will be at odds with the belief systems of some individuals who 
are subject to the law. 
  
of beliefs.  Thus, although Justice Souter makes no claim regarding belief liberty in his 
concurrence, I believe my approach is consonant with his analysis. 
 104 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944) (citations omitted).  
In Prince, the appellant was seeking a higher degree of protection for her religious 
beliefs than would have been accorded secular beliefs under the First Amendment.  See 
id. at 164. 
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But, obviously, such a law does not require individuals 
subject to the law to change their beliefs.  An employer who is 
required to hire a gay person or a hotel owner who is required 
to rent to a gay couple may continue to believe whatever he or 
she wishes about the immorality or sinfulness of 
homosexuality.  To grasp the full impact of such laws, 
therefore, it is necessary to explicate and acknowledge the 
logical intertwining that many people (including religious 
people) experience between their conduct and their beliefs such 
that compliance with a neutral civil rights law may burden 
their belief liberty. 
Obviously, in a complex society, conduct must be 
regulated in a way that belief need not be.  That is a truism.  
From the Supreme Court’s ringing protection of belief in West 
Virginia v. Barnette105 to its consistent refrain that religious 
beliefs will be protected in a manner that religious conduct will 
not be,106 the logical distinction between conduct and belief has 
been clear. 
But it does not follow from that truism that conduct 
should always be viewed as completely apart and distinct from 
belief.  Certainly, courts have recognized that particular 
conduct may be used to communicate an expressive belief.107  
Why should it be so difficult to accept that engaging in certain 
conduct (or being precluded from engaging in certain conduct) 
will undermine an individual’s strongly held beliefs? 
Indeed, I would argue that gay people—of all 
individuals—should recognize the injustice of forcing a person 
to disaggregate belief or identity from practice.  For years, gay 
people have been told by some entities that they should 
separate their status from their conduct.  In the religious 
arena, this is framed as “loving the sinner, but hating the sin.”  
  
 105 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein.  If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.”). 
 106 The Supreme Court has often observed that while there is an absolute 
right to hold religious beliefs, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 219 
(1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), religiously grounded conduct 
is not absolutely protected, see, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986); Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 220; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).  
 107 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (stating that flag 
burning as a political statement constitutes expressive conduct); Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (stating that the display of a flag bearing a peace symbol is 
constitutionally protected expressive conduct); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 
376-77 (1968) (recognizing that symbolic conduct is constitutionally protected). 
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That is, gay people have been told that their status as 
individuals with homosexual orientation is not inherently 
sinful—but that if they act in a way consistent with that 
orientation, then they are engaging in sin. 
In the legal arena, this approach to a gay person’s 
identity and being has been framed as the “status/conduct” 
distinction.  Particularly as a means of dealing with the 
holding in Hardwick, some legal advocates have argued that 
their clients should not be discriminated against for the status 
of being gay, although they have deliberately failed to claim 
equal non-discrimination rights for their clients’ rights to 
engage in gay conduct.108  From the moment I became aware of 
this legal approach, I have detested it and argued against it.109  
It seemed to me the height of disingenuousness, absurdity and 
indeed disrespect, to tell someone it is permissible to “be” gay, 
but not permissible to engage in gay sex.  What do they think 
being gay means? 
I have the same reaction to those who blithely assume a 
religious person can easily disengage her religious belief and 
self-identity from her religious practice and religious behavior.  
What do they think being religious means?  Of course, at some 
basic level, religion is about a set of beliefs.  But for many 
religious people across many religious denominations (Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish and Muslim—to note just the ones I have 
some personal understanding of), the day-to-day practice of 
one’s religion is an essential way of bringing meaning to such 
beliefs.  And while religious beliefs on homosexuality may seem 
the most familiar to us, there may be people with strongly held 
secular beliefs who feel just as strongly on the issue. 
  
 108 See Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, supra note 20, at 290-96 (detailing cases 
in which the “status-conduct” distinction has been used).  As I noted in that article:  
Instead of countering the ramifications of Hardwick by decoupling sodomy 
and homosexual conduct, many gay rights attorneys have implicitly accepted 
the equivalence between homosexual conduct and homosexual sodomy and 
have instead sought to decouple homosexual orientation from homosexual 
conduct. This approach has produced victories in court for a few individual 
gay and lesbian plaintiffs, but at a cost to equal protection for gay people 
generally, and at a potential cost to the development of a more effective 
paradigm for equal rights for gay people. 
Id. at 290. 
 109 See id. at 290-96; Chai Feldblum, Based on a Moral Vision: The Majority in 
Romer v. Evans Could—and Should—Have Engaged the Dissent Directly on the Role of 
Popular Morality in Making Laws, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S31; Chai R. 
Feldblum, Keep the Sex in Same-Sex Marriage, 4 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 23 (1997). 
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Given this perspective, it makes sense to me that three 
born-again Christians who run a chain of sports and health 
clubs would feel that “[t]heir fundamentalist religious 
convictions require them to act in accordance with the 
teachings of Jesus Christ and the will of God in their business 
as well as in their personal lives,” and hence mandate them to 
hire only employees who conform to their views about proper 
sexual behavior.110  It also makes sense to me that these same 
owners would feel their religion compels them to have these 
employees “talk[] to homosexuals about their religious views 
and sexual preference and [tell] them homosexuality [is] 
wrong.”111  And I can well understand the elderly Christian 
woman who believes “God will judge her if she permits people 
to engage in sex outside of marriage in her rental units and 
that if she does so, she will be prevented from meeting her 
deceased husband in the hereafter.”112
Whether such conduct should legitimately be permitted 
in a workplace or a public accommodation is a separate 
question.  But at this stage of the analysis, we should be 
concerned solely with whether a burden on belief liberty exists, 
not whether the burden is justified.  The relevant question at 
this stage is how a court or a legislature should respond to an 
allegation that engaging in certain conduct, in compliance with 
a neutral law, burdens an individual’s beliefs that constitute a 
core aspect of that individual’s sense of self. 
My argument is that we should err on the side of 
accepting the person’s allegation for purposes of deciding 
whether a burden on liberty exists. (Again, this is different 
from the subsequent step of deciding whether the burden on 
liberty is ultimately justified.)  In erring on the side of the 
person making the allegation, there must of course be some 
basis to the person’s claim that will situate the belief liberty 
interest on the upper end of the liberty spectrum.  That is, the 
person must demonstrate that he or she holds a particular 
belief that is core to his or her sense of self and must make a 
credible claim that engaging in certain conduct would be 
inconsistent with that belief.  But beyond that, I do not believe 
  
 110 McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1985) (en 
banc). 
 111 Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, 373 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985), aff’d, 389 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1986).   
 112 Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 
1996). 
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the government acts appropriately when it second-guesses the 
individual and concludes, for example, “Really, this isn’t such a 
burden on your belief.” 
Many judges have been unsympathetic to religious 
individuals’ claims that a neutral law burdens their religious 
beliefs.  As I describe below, sometimes judges wrap the 
justification for the burden into the analysis of whether a 
burden exists in the first place.  Sometimes judges creatively 
construe a law so as to result in the absence of a burden and 
sometimes judges simply dismiss the religious person’s 
allegation that a burden exists.   
For example, in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing 
Commission, the Supreme Court of California considered 
whether a housing law that prohibited discrimination based on 
marital status imposed a “significant burden” on a religious 
landlady who did not wish to rent to an unmarried, 
heterosexual couple.113  The court concluded that no such 
significant burden existed because the landlady could invest 
her capital in an enterprise other than housing.114 The court 
also noted that the landlady’s religious beliefs did not “require 
her to rent apartments; the religious injunction is simply that 
she not rent to unmarried couples.”115  In light of that fact, the 
court concluded: “No religious exercise is burdened if she 
follows the alternative course of placing her capital in another 
investment.”116
  
 113 Id. at 918-19.  As I note in the text, the woman in this case was afraid she 
would not see her husband in the hereafter if she rented to the unmarried couple.  See 
supra note 112.  The court used the formulation of a “significant burden” because it 
was applying the standard set forth in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  Smith, 
913 P.2d at 919. 
 114 Id. at 926.  The court was contrasting the burden on a religious person who 
lost his or her job because of a refusal to work on the Sabbath and who then sought 
unemployment compensation: 
[T]he degree of compulsion involved is markedly greater in the 
unemployment-compensation cases than in the case before us.  In the former 
instance, one can avoid the conflict between the law and one’s beliefs about 
the Sabbath only by quitting work and foregoing compensation.  To do so, 
however, is not a realistic solution for someone who lives on the wages earned 
through personal labor.  In contrast, one who earns a living through the 
return on capital invested in rental properties can, if she does not wish to 
comply with an antidiscrimination law that conflicts with her religious 
beliefs, avoid the conflict, without threatening her livelihood, by selling her 
units and redeploying the capital in other investments. 
Id. 
 115 Id. at 926. 
 116 Id. 
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A similar analysis was advanced by a dissenting judge 
in Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,117 a 
state court ruling in California that also concerned a religious 
couple who did not wish to rent to unmarried, cohabiting 
heterosexual couples.  In concluding that the burden on the 
couple’s religious conduct was slight, the dissenting judge first 
observed that the couple “d[id] not contend that refusing to 
rent to unmarried cohabitants is a central tenet of their 
religious belief,” nor did they “contend that the burden imposed 
by the statute prohibits them from practicing their religion.”118  
Rather, the couple’s only contention, observed the dissenting 
judge, was that “if they are compelled to rent to unmarried 
cohabitants, they would be—in effect—aiders and abettors in 
the commission of sin by others in violation of their own 
religious beliefs.”119
The dissenting judge was unsympathetic to this 
concern.  As the judge concluded: 
The Donahues are the owners of a five-unit apartment building 
which they rent to members of the general public.  They are engaged 
in secular commercial conduct performed for profit.  There are no 
religious motivations for their conduct. The statute does not require 
the Donahues to aid and abet “sinners,” it merely requires them “to 
act in a nondiscriminatory manner toward all prospective [tenants].  
A legal compulsion . . . to refrain from discriminating against 
[prospective tenants] on the basis of [marital status] can hardly be 
characterized as an endorsement” or the aiding or abetting of sin.120
In the case involving born-again Christians who owned 
and operated a chain of sports and health clubs in Minneapolis, 
a Minnesota court found no burden on the owners’ religious 
beliefs by offering a creative interpretation of the State’s gay 
civil rights law. The court observed that “based on his 
understanding of the Bible, Owens [the owner of the clubs] (the 
  
 117 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).  For subsequent appellate history of 
this case, see infra note 120. 
 118 Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49 (Grignon, J., dissenting). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (quoting Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  The Donahue majority found a 
burden on the couple’s free exercise of religion, as prohibited by the state constitution, 
and that the State did not have a sufficiently compelling interest in prohibiting marital 
status discrimination to override that exercise of religion.  Id. at 46 (majority opinion).  
The opinion in Donahue was superseded by an order granting review, 825 P.2d 766 
(Cal. 1992); the review was then dismissed and the case remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 
1993).  The case of Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 
(Cal. 1996), discussed supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text, was decided three 
years after Donahue was remanded. 
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other principals agree with him) clearly is opposed to 
homosexual acts.”121   For example, quoting from the trial 
transcript, the court noted that Owens had emphasized that, 
with regard to homosexuals, he has “a love, a heartfelt love for 
them, but not for the activity.  The same way I would have a 
heartfelt love for anybody; but as God says in his word, we can 
hate the sin but we love the sinner.”122   
But, the court observed, the Minneapolis ordinance 
prohibited discrimination “based on affectional preference, not 
acts.”123  Thus, the court concluded: “From [Owens’] words it 
would be difficult to conclude that his Christianity supports 
discrimination based on preference rather than acts.  Thus, the 
Minneapolis ordinance as applied in this case does not impose 
a burden upon Owens’ free exercise of religion.”124
In other words, because the State’s civil rights law 
prohibited discrimination solely on gay “status,” and not on gay 
“conduct,” the obligation on the owners not to discriminate on 
the basis of “affectional preference” could logically have no 
impact on their belief that homosexual conduct was immoral.  
In fact, the State’s law seemed perfectly matched to the owners’ 
beliefs in loving the sinner, but hating the sin. 
Of course, the fact that most of the gay men frequenting 
the sports and health club were presumably also having gay 
sex at some point was ignored by the court.  Thus, the court’s 
analysis, while offering an ironic twist on the status-conduct 
distinction, seems as riddled with illogic as when the 
distinction is applied in gay rights cases. 
Some of the more sophisticated judicial analyses of the 
possible burden that civil rights laws place on religious beliefs 
are represented in the various opinions issued in Gay Rights 
Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown 
University.125  This case concerned the refusal of Georgetown 
University, a Jesuit school, to recognize gay student groups 
that had organized at the University and the Law School.126  
The university administration permitted the gay student 
  
 121 Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, 373 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985), aff’d, 389 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1986). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id.  
 125 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). 
 126 Id. at 8-14. 
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groups to exist and to use various school facilities.127  However, 
the administration drew the line at “endorsing” the student 
groups.  If it allowed the groups to use the Georgetown name, 
receive university funds and have access to subsidized office 
space, telephone service, office supplies and equipment, the 
administration felt it would be connoting its endorsement of 
the groups.128  As the administration explained: 
This situation involves a controversial matter of faith and the moral 
teachings of the Catholic Church.  “Official” subsidy and support of a 
gay student organization would be interpreted by many as 
endorsement of the positions taken by the gay movement on a full 
range of issues.  While the University supports and cherishes the 
individual lives and rights of its students it will not subsidize this 
cause.  Such an endorsement would be inappropriate for a Catholic 
University.129
Judge Pryor’s concurrence provides a good example of a 
judge simply not accepting the allegations of a religious person 
(or, in this case, a religious institution):  
I do not understand Georgetown to argue that discrimination 
against any persons or groups is a tenet of its faith.  Rather, it 
claims that providing the disputed facilities and services to the gay 
student organizations infringes the University’s religious interest in 
embracing a particular doctrine of sexual ethics.  Therefore, to 
require the University to make available its facilities and services in 
an even-handed manner works, at most, an indirect infringement of 
its religious interest.  For just as enforcement of the prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of political affiliation does not 
signify endorsement of any particular political party, enforcement of 
the Human Rights Act’s ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation does not signify endorsement by the government or by 
the covered entity of any particular doctrine of sexual ethics.130  
In contrast to Judge Pryor’s concurrence, the plurality 
opinion in the Georgetown case parsed the situation somewhat 
differently—acknowledging that D.C.’s law did place some 
burden on the University, but nevertheless refusing to accept 
fully the University’s allegations with regard to that burden.  
The plurality first interpreted the D.C. Human Rights Act 
(which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation) 
  
 127 See id. at 10. 
 128 Id. at 11-12. 
 129 Id. (quoting Memorandum from Dean W. Schuerman, Georgetown Univ., to 
the Student Government, Georgetown Univ. (Feb. 6, 1979) (emphasis added by the 
Court)). 
 130 Id. at 45 (Pryor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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as not requiring that any covered entity, including Georgetown 
University, endorse a gay group.131  The plurality concluded: 
“[T]he Human Rights Act does not require one private actor to 
‘endorse’ the ideas or conduct of another.”132
Instead, the plurality focused on the “mere” conduct 
required by the law: 
While the Human Rights Act does not seek to compel uniformity in 
philosophical attitudes by force of law, it does require equal 
treatment.  Equality of treatment in educational institutions is 
concretely measured by nondiscriminatory provision of access to 
“facilities and services.” . . . Georgetown’s refusal to provide tangible 
benefits without regard to sexual orientation violated the Human 
Rights Act.  To that extent only, we consider the merits of 
Georgetown’s free exercise defense.133  
Thus, the plurality held that the D.C. law required that 
the University simply engage in the conduct of providing funds, 
facilities and services in an even-handed manner to the gay 
student groups.  The plurality then simply asserted that 
providing such funds, facilities and services did not translate 
into an endorsement of the groups’ beliefs on sexual ethics, 
despite the University’s clear statement that it viewed 
precisely such actions as connoting endorsement.134
A classic mark of judges who downplay the burden on 
religious people who are forced to engage in certain conduct is 
an unwillingness to err on the side of accepting the allegation 
that conduct can impair belief.  For those of us who believe that 
government should err on the side of accepting such allegations 
(whether the allegation is that engaging in certain conduct will 
impair a person’s religiously based belief or secularly based 
belief), the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
& Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”)135 was particularly 
troubling.   
The core argument of the law schools and law faculty in 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR was that forcing the schools to act in a 
  
 131 Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 16 (plurality 
opinion). 
 132 Id. at 17. 
 133 Id. at 5 (quoting D.C. CODE § 1-2520 (1987)). 
 134 The plurality, unlike Judge Pryor, then accepted that there was a burden 
on the school in forcing the University to provide tangible benefits to the student 
groups (albeit a less minor burden than an forced endorsement would have been), and 
that the burden was outweighed by the State’s compelling interest in prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Id. at 38. 
 135 ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
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certain way burdened their freedom of speech and freedom of 
expressive association.136  The cavalier manner in which the 
Court treated FAIR’s allegations does not bode well for future 
claims made by those who feel their religious or secular beliefs 
are being burdened when they are forced to comply with 
neutral civil rights laws.137  
In FAIR, the law schools and law faculty claimed that 
the government burdened their freedom of speech and their 
freedom of expressive association138 by requiring that they treat 
military recruiters better than other recruiters who 
discriminate based on sexual orientation.139  The schools and 
faculty argued that while military recruitment was a 
compelling government interest, forcing the schools to treat 
military recruiters similarly to other recruiters (with no 
symbolic or logistical differences to convey the schools’ 
  
 136 Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 137 Indeed, it was precisely the fear that people who wished to discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender or race would use the argument that 
complying with a civil rights law burdened their freedom of expression that made so 
many gay rights and civil rights advocates welcome the result in the FAIR decision.  
See, e.g., Brief of Prof. William Alford et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
21-22, FAIR, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152), available at http://www.law. 
georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/FAIRamicusHarvard.pdf (urging the Court to 
decide the case on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, to avoid providing 
constitutional shelter to those seeking to evade anti-discrimination laws); Jack Balkin, 
All’s FAIR in Law and War, BALKINIZATION, Mar. 15, 2006,  http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2006/03/alls-fair-in-law-and-war.html (discussing the problems the law schools’ 
possible success in FAIR would pose for the enforceability of anti-discrimination laws); 
Dale Carpenter, Balkin on Solomon, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Mar. 15, 2006, 
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1142448786.shtml (same).  As I explain further infra, I 
believe the result in FAIR was both wrong and unfortunate.  Moreover, I do not believe 
a contrary result would have given carte blanche to those who wish to discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation, gender, race, or any other ground.  It would, however, 
have ensured that the burdens that neutral civil rights laws place on those who 
disagree with the premises of such laws would have been made more transparent, 
would have been accorded some recognition, and would have been justified in the legal 
process. 
 138 See Brief for the Respondents at 16-33, FAIR, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 
(No. 04-1152). 
 139 As a general matter, law firms and law organizations that do not attest to 
the fact that they do not discriminate on the basis of sex, race, religion, national origin, 
disability, or sexual orientation are not provided assistance by law schools in the 
recruitment process.  See Assoc. of Am. Law Sch., Executive Comm. Regulations, Reg. 
6-3.1, http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations.php#6 (last visited Oct. 4, 2006) 
(requiring, in order to enforce the Association of American Law Schools’ (“AALS”) anti-
discrimination by-laws, employers who recruit at law schools to provide written 
assurance that they do not discriminate on any of the grounds prohibited in AALS’ by-
laws); see also Brief of Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 2, 5, FAIR, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/FAIRamicusNALP.pdf (discussing 
same policy). 
112 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
disapproval of the military’s recruitment policy) was not 
narrowly tailored to fit the compelling government interest of 
military recruitment.140
What exactly was the burden about which the schools 
and faculty were complaining?  Obviously, the government was 
not requiring that the law schools pronounce their support for 
the statutory policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which set the 
parameters of military recruitment and which prohibited the 
recruitment of openly gay law students as JAG Corps officers.  
No such speech was being coerced.  Nor was the government 
prohibiting schools from loudly expressing their belief that 
appropriate legal recruitment would place no weight on the 
sexual orientation of law students.  To the extent that a school 
viewed itself as creating an expressive community based on 
such a view of justice, the government was not standing in its 
way. 
The “only” thing the government was requiring from the 
law schools was a simple act of conduct:  it was requiring that 
schools treat military recruiters equally to all other recruiters, 
even though the law schools viewed the military recruiters as 
advancing, and possibly embodying, an unjust and perhaps 
immoral position. Where was the burden in requiring such 
conduct? 141
As with some religious people’s claims that the act of 
complying with a neutral civil rights law burdens their 
religious beliefs, the answer lies in the inherent entangling 
between conduct and practice in some situations.   
In most situations, of course, conduct is not intended to 
convey expression.  For that reason, one does not ordinarily feel 
  
 140 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 138, at 18, 44-48. 
 141 As the Supreme Court put it: “The Solomon Amendment neither limits 
what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything. . . .  As a general matter, 
the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech.  It affects what law schools 
must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not 
say.”  FAIR, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1307.  Although the manner in which the 
government obtained compliance from the law schools was via the threat of 
withholding funds, the Supreme Court concluded that the government could have 
demanded such compliance directly without violating the Federal Constitution.  Id.  
For that reason, it was irrelevant that the government used the method of conditioning 
conduct on the receipt of spending.  Id. (“This case does not require us to determine 
when a condition placed on university funding goes beyond the ‘reasonable’ choice 
offered in Grove City [College v. Bell] and becomes an unconstitutional condition.  It is 
clear that a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally 
imposed directly.  Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from 
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access requirement, the statute does not 
place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds.” (citation omitted)).  
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that a requirement to engage in certain conduct (or not to 
engage in certain conduct) necessarily undermines one’s 
identity or beliefs.  We engage in innumerable acts throughout 
the day.  We might get on the subway in the morning, buy a 
newspaper, order lunch, give an exam or take an exam, fix a 
car, buy stock or feed a baby.  We rarely experience ourselves 
as expressing a belief system when we engage in these forms of 
conduct.  Beliefs may underlie our actions (for example, public 
transportation is good; newspapers should be supported; babies 
should be cared for); but it is rare that we experience our 
conduct (or our lack of engaging in certain conduct) as 
inherently intertwined with our beliefs and identities. 
But that is not always the case.  Sometimes being forced 
to engage in certain conduct—or being precluded from 
engaging in certain conduct—will impinge on our beliefs or 
identities.  This is not an overly difficult situation to perceive.  
It is certainly not beyond the sophistication of a legislature or a 
court to ascertain.  It requires that an individual articulate a 
particular belief or identity, and then articulate how being 
forced to engage in an act (or how being prohibited from 
engaging in an act) will interfere with, or will undermine, that 
belief or identity.   
This is precisely the situation that the law schools and 
law faculty faced in FAIR.  The schools and faculty experienced 
the “mere” conduct of assisting military recruiters as 
undermining their expressive beliefs.  The members of FAIR 
held two expressive beliefs: first, that law students should be 
hired without regard to their sexual orientation, and second, 
that aiding and abetting any recruiter who took sexual 
orientation into account in hiring was unjust.  Thus, a mandate 
by the government that the schools assist military recruiters 
who did not hire openly gay law students was experienced by 
the schools as burdening that second belief.  Because the belief 
itself related to conduct (i.e., it is unjust to aid and abet a 
discriminatory recruiter), the mandate to engage in certain 
conduct (i.e., treat military recruiters the same as other 
recruiters) necessarily burdened that belief. 
The Supreme Court got around this difficulty by simply 
refusing to accept that the government’s requirement that the 
law schools engage in certain conduct burdened their 
expressive beliefs—much as some judges simply refuse to 
accept that a requirement to engage in certain conduct burdens 
the religious beliefs of an individual or an institution.  The 
Court first recast the schools’ argument as a concern that 
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assisting military recruiters would mean that students would 
get confused and would not be able to differentiate the military 
recruiters’ message from the schools’ message.  To that 
contrived concern, the Court wryly responded: “We have held 
that high school students can appreciate the difference between 
speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because 
legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.  
Surely students have not lost that ability by the time they get 
to law school.”142
The schools’ actual concern—that simply engaging in 
the conduct of hosting the military recruiters undermines the 
schools’ expressive belief in non-discrimination—was simply 
dismissed by the Court in a conclusory manner: 
To comply with the [Solomon Amendment], law schools must allow 
military recruiters on campus and assist them in whatever way the 
school chooses to assist other employers.  Law schools therefore 
“associate” with military recruiters in the sense that they interact 
with them.  But recruiters are not part of the law school.  Recruiters 
are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited 
purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the 
school’s expressive association.  This distinction is critical.  Unlike 
the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment 
does not force a law school “to accept members it does not desire.”143
Thus, the Court asserted that the conduct of associating 
with military recruiters who are not members of the school did 
not undermine the law schools’ expressive beliefs.  The fact 
that the law schools experienced the association as causing 
precisely that result was simply ignored by the Court and 
dismissed. 
Religious employers who do not want to provide health 
benefits to same-sex couples and religious schools who do not 
want to provide funding for gay rights groups might view 
themselves as far removed from law schools that do not wish to 
assist military recruiters who discriminate against gay law 
students.  But the parallels between the two groups are stark:  
In each case, an individual or an institution experiences the 
coerced conduct (the “equality mandate”) as burdening its 
beliefs.  And in each case, the individual or institution runs the 
risk that the State and the courts will simply dismiss its 
experience of burden as not real. 
  
 142 Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1310 (citations omitted).  
 143 Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640, 648 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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C. Justifying the Burden on Belief Liberty 
It may be cold comfort to those with strongly held beliefs 
regarding the immorality and sinfulness of homosexuality that 
I argue that the burden on their belief liberty should be 
acknowledged.  After all, as I note in the beginning of this 
article and as I hope to make clear in this section, I believe it 
will rarely be the case that a court should use the Due Process 
Clause to insert an exemption to an LGBT equality law in 
order to accommodate the belief liberty of those who are 
regulated by the law.144
As Justice Souter contended in his Glucksberg 
concurrence, a court should not intervene “merely to identify a 
reasonable resolution of contending values that differs from the 
terms of the legislation under review.”145  Rather, “[i]t is only 
when the legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued, is 
so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as 
to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must 
give way.”146
Under this approach, I find it difficult to envision any 
circumstance in which a court could legitimately conclude that 
a legislature that has passed a LGBT equality law, with no 
exceptions for individual religious people based on belief 
liberty, has acted arbitrarily or pointlessly.  If the “justifying 
principle” of the legislation is to protect the liberty of LGBT 
people to live freely and safely in all parts of society, it is 
perfectly reasonable for a legislature not to provide any 
exemption that will cordon off a significant segment of society 
from the anti-discrimination prohibition.  This may not be the 
result a particular judge might have reached were she in the 
legislature, but it is certainly a “reasonable resolution of 
contending values” for a legislature to have reached.  
Nevertheless, I believe explicating the burden that such 
civil rights laws may place on some individuals’ belief liberty is 
still worthwhile. While a court should not be permitted to re-
strike a balance between competing liberties when the balance 
already struck by the legislature is reasonable, that does not 
  
 144 To the extent that any equality law regulated belief directly, it should be 
held invalid under the First Amendment.  To the extent that forced compliance with an 
equality mandate burdened an individual’s belief liberty, my argument in this section 
is that such a burden is likely to be justified. 
 145 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 712, 768 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 146 Id. 
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mean the legislature should not choose to place certain 
exemptions in the law at the outset.  The utility in 
acknowledging the burdens on belief liberty that might arise 
from the application of civil rights laws is that advocates of 
such laws might see their way to deciding that the legislature 
should protect belief liberty in a limited set of circumstances.  
Indeed, the best outcome would be for such decisions to be 
made in a negotiated setting with those whose beliefs will be 
adversely impacted by the law.   
It probably seems dangerous to advocates of LGBT 
equality to acknowledge that a civil rights law might burden 
the liberty of those who are regulated by the law.  This is 
because laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation that have been held to burden a constitutionally 
protected right have not fared well in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence thus far.147  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale,148 creating an exemption for the Boy 
Scouts of America to New Jersey’s law prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, is the classic 
example.   
In Dale, the Court spent the bulk of its opinion 
explaining why it agreed with the Boy Scouts that forcing the 
organization to retain James Dale as an assistant scoutmaster, 
after Dale had acknowledged he was gay, would “significantly 
burden”149 the Boy Scouts’ desire “to not promote homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”150   
As can be deduced from what I have written thus far, I 
have only a small quarrel with the Court’s analysis in that 
regard.  It seems eminently reasonable to me that a group that 
wishes to convey the message that homosexual behavior is 
immoral, wrong and unacceptable would not want one of its 
leaders to be a happy, well-adjusted and ordinary-seeming gay 
person.  My small quarrel with the Court’s analysis is that the 
Boy Scouts failed to consistently and clearly convey such a 
  
 147 Indeed, I believe it is precisely because this argument has so consistently 
failed that proponents of LGBT equality believe they must retreat to the position of 
denying the existence of any burden on a possible constitutional right to begin with.  
However, the same optimism that fuels my belief that the legal landscape will 
ultimately change for LGBT people also makes me believe that courts will begin to 
accept the compelling interest that government has in ensuring that LGBT people can 
live lives of honesty and safety. 
 148 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 149 Id. at 659. 
 150 Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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message about homosexuality to its members.  I have no 
difficulty accepting an organization’s statement of its beliefs 
and then deferring to that organization’s allegation that 
engaging in certain conduct will undermine those beliefs.  
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the organization must 
clearly state its beliefs and then conform its actions to those 
beliefs in a logical fashion.  The Boy Scouts’ position was 
problematic on both fronts: first, the organization’s public 
membership documents did not clearly state that 
homosexuality was inconsistent with the Boy Scouts’ oath, and 
second, the organization did not consistently remove 
heterosexual scoutmasters who publicly stated that 
homosexuality was acceptable.151
But the fatal flaw in the Court’s Dale opinion, from my 
perspective, is its failure to truly examine whether the burden 
on the Boy Scouts was justified.  This would have required, 
first, a careful analysis of the State’s interest in prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in order to 
determine the importance of that interest.  Next, it would have 
required an analysis of whether refusing to include an 
exemption in the law for entities whose expressive association 
beliefs would thereby be burdened was “so far from being 
commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily 
or pointlessly applied.”152
If that analysis had been done, and if the Court had 
taken seriously the adverse impact on the identity liberty of 
gay people when a government fails to protect them from 
private discrimination, I believe the Court would have 
appropriately determined that a group as large and as broad-
based as the Boy Scouts should not have been granted an 
exemption from the state law.   
But the Court’s analysis in Dale regarding whether New 
Jersey’s interests in protecting gay people justified its 
burdening of the Boy Scouts’ expressive association rights was 
neither thorough nor thoughtful.  The Court’s “analysis” 
consisted of the following three sentences:  
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy 
Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly 
burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor homosexual 
conduct.  The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public 
  
 151 On the importance of the latter point, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating 
the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1611-13 (2001). 
 152 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the 
Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.  That being 
the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from 
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public 
accommodations law.153
“That being the case?” The very lack of analysis in the 
Court’s opinion—the simple reliance on these conclusory 
words—was a slap in the face of gay people.154
The plurality in the Georgetown case did a better job of 
analyzing the compelling interest a government might have in 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  
After delving extensively into the literature regarding sexual 
orientation, as well as exploring the legislative history of the 
D.C. Council’s ordinance, the plurality noted the following: 
The Council determined that a person’s sexual orientation, like a 
person’s race and sex, for example, tells nothing of value about his or 
her attitudes, characteristics, abilities or limitations.  It is a false 
measure of individual worth, one unfair and oppressive to the person 
concerned, one harmful to others because discrimination inflicts a 
grave and recurring injury upon society as a whole.  To put an end to 
this evil, the Council outlawed sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment, in real estate transactions, in public accommodations, 
in educational institutions, and elsewhere.  Such comprehensive 
measures were necessary to ensure that “[e]very individual shall 
have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the economic, 
cultural and intellectual life of the District, and to have an equal 
opportunity to participate in all aspects of life . . . .”155
The plurality also invoked the majestic sweep of the 
federal constitutional liberty interest in underscoring the 
importance of a State interest in prohibiting discrimination 
based on sexual orientation: 
The compelling interests, therefore, that any state has in eradicating 
discrimination against the homosexually or bisexually oriented 
include the fostering of individual dignity, the creation of a climate 
and environment in which each individual can utilize his or her 
  
 153 Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added). 
 154 For additional cases finding that a civil rights law may not be applied in a 
manner that burdens the religious beliefs of an individual or organization because of 
the lack of a compelling state interest, see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 
165 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (no compelling 
government interest in protecting unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual couples); Walker 
v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San Francisco, No. 760-028, 1980 WL 4657, 
at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980) (interest of city of San Francisco in its gay rights 
ordinance was not compelling). 
 155 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 
536 A.2d 1, 32 (1987) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
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potential to contribute to and benefit from society, and equal 
protection of the life, liberty and property that the Founding Fathers 
guaranteed to us all.156
Ensuring that LGBT people can live honestly and safely in all 
aspects of their social lives requires that society set a baseline 
of non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.  If individual business owners, service 
providers and employers could easily exempt themselves from 
such laws by making credible claims that their belief liberty is 
burdened by the law, LGBT people would remain constantly 
vulnerable to surprise discrimination.  If I am denied a job, an 
apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restaurant or a 
procedure by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep, 
intense and tangible hurt.  That hurt is not alleviated because I 
might be able to go down the street and get a job, an 
apartment, a hotel room, a restaurant table or a medical 
procedure from someone else.  The assault to my dignity and 
my sense of safety in the world occurs when the initial denial 
happens. That assault is not mitigated by the fact that others 
might not treat me in the same way.157     
Thus, for all my sympathy for the evangelical Christian 
couple who may wish to run a bed and breakfast from which 
they can exclude unmarried, straight couples and all gay 
couples, this is a point where I believe the “zero-sum” nature of 
the game inevitably comes into play.  And, in making the 
decision in this zero-sum game, I am convinced society should 
come down on the side of protecting the liberty of LGBT people.  
Once individuals choose to enter the stream of economic 
commerce by opening commercial establishments, I believe it is 
legitimate to require that they play by certain rules.158  If the 
  
 156 Id. at 37. 
 157 As the court observed in Smith v. Fair Employment Housing Commission, 
“[T]o permit Smith to discriminate would sacrifice the rights of her prospective tenants 
to have equal access to public accommodations and their legal and dignity interests in 
freedom from discrimination based on personal characteristics.”  913 P.2d 909, 925 
(Cal. 1996).  Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) 
(“the fundamental object of [federal civil rights legislation] was to vindicate ‘the 
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to 
public establishments.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 872, at 16-17 (1964))). 
 158 A number of writers have made the argument that entering the stream of 
commerce should legitimately subject an enterprise to civil rights laws.  See, e.g., Mark 
Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy Scout Case Was Rightly (But Wrongly) 
Decided, 35 CONN L. REV. 129, 157 (2002) (contending that “[o]rganizations engaged in 
commerce should not be cloaked with fundamental or First Amendment freedom to 
exclude members on any bases they see fit”); Maureen E. Markey, The 
Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 
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government tolerated the private exclusionary policies of such 
individuals in the commercial sector, such toleration would 
necessarily come at the cost of gay people’s sense of belonging 
and safety in society.  Just as we do not tolerate private racial 
beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the 
commercial arena, even if such beliefs are based on religious 
views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about 
sexual orientation and gender identity that adversely affect 
LGBT people.159
But that is not to say that we should not acknowledge 
that this zero-sum game has resulted in a burden on some 
individuals’ belief liberty and that we not be forced to 
articulate why such a burden is appropriate.  A government’s 
reasons for burdening liberty should be, as Professor Rebecca 
Brown argues, “accessible to all in a meaningful sense.”160  
Brown defines these as reasons that “have some public and 
secular component to them and [do] not rest entirely on 
personal moral belief systems not universally shared.”161  While 
I am not sure I would use Brown’s formulation of a “personal 
moral belief system[] not universally shared,” I do believe that 
the reasons given by the State must “reflect the public good.”162  
And ensuring that members of the public who have a morally 
neutral characteristic are able to live without fear or 
vulnerability of discrimination based on that characteristic 
certainly seems to be a reason that reflects the public good. 
The question remains, however, whether there are 
limited situations in which a legislature should choose to 
protect the belief liberty of individuals or institutions over the 
  
549-52 (1998) (suggesting that the government need not show a compelling state 
interest test for anti-discrimination laws in free exercise cases in which religious 
people have engaged in voluntary commercial activity); Wessels, supra note 4, at 1231 
(urging protection for religious groups from civil rights laws when the group looks 
“inward” to itself as a religious community, but not when the group “turns outwards” in 
providing services to others in the community). 
 159 For cases finding that the government interest in prohibiting racial 
discrimination was sufficiently compelling to justify a burden on religious beliefs, see 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 
256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 400 
(1968). 
 160 Brown, supra note 61, at 1547.   
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 162 Id.  Brown draws significantly on the work of political theorists to argue 
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interest in protecting the safety and dignity of LGBT people.  I 
believe there are two situations that are worth exploring. 
As a general matter, once a religious person or 
institution enters the stream of commerce by operating an 
enterprise such as a doctor’s office, hospital, bookstore, hotel, 
treatment center and so on, I believe the enterprise must 
adhere to a norm of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  This is essential so that an 
individual who happens upon the enterprise is not surprised by 
a denial of service and/or a directive to go down the street to a 
different provider.  While I was initially drawn to the idea of 
providing an exemption to those enterprises that advertise 
solely in very limited milieus (such as the bed and breakfast 
that advertises only on Christian Web sites), I became wary of 
such an approach as a practical matter.  The touchstone needs 
to be, I believe, whether LGBT people would be made 
vulnerable in too many locations across society.  An 
“advertising exception” seemed potentially subject to 
significant abuse. 
Nevertheless, I believe there might be a more limited 
exception that would be justified.  There are enterprises that 
are engaged in by belief communities (almost always religious 
belief communities) that are specifically designed to inculcate 
values in the next generation.  These may include schools, day 
care centers, summer camps and tours.  These enterprises are 
sometimes for-profit and sometimes not-for-profit.  They are 
within the general stream of commerce, together with many 
other schools, day care centers, summer camps and tours. 
I believe a subset of these enterprises present a 
compelling case for the legislature to provide an exemption in a 
law mandating non-discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
The criteria for an exemption should be as follows: the 
enterprise must present itself clearly and explicitly as designed 
to inculcate a set of beliefs; the beliefs of the enterprise must be 
clearly set forth as being inconsistent with a belief that 
homosexuality is morally neutral and the enterprise must seek 
to enroll only individuals who wish to be inculcated with such 
beliefs.   
The dignity of LGBT individuals would still be harmed 
by excluding such enterprises from the purview of an anti-
discrimination law.  But in weighing the interests between the 
groups, I believe the harm to the enterprise in having its 
inculcation of values to its members significantly hampered (as 
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I believe it would be if it was forced to comply with such a law) 
outweighs the harm to the excluded LGBT members. 
I am more hesitant regarding the second limited 
circumstance, but I offer it for analysis and criticism.163  I 
believe there may be a legitimate exemption that should be 
provided with regard to leadership positions in enterprises that 
are more broadly represented in commerce.  Many religious 
institutions operate the gamut of social services in the 
community, such as hospitals, gyms, adoption agencies and 
drug treatment centers.  These enterprises are open and 
marketed to the general public and often receive governmental 
funds.  It seems quite appropriate to require that the 
enterprises’ services be delivered without regard to sexual 
orientation and that most employment positions in these 
enterprises be available without regard to sexual orientation. 
But the balance of interests, it seems to me, shifts with 
regard to the leadership positions in such enterprises.  
Particularly for religiously-affiliated institutions, I believe it is 
important that people in leadership positions be able to 
articulate the beliefs and values of the enterprise.  If the 
identity and practice of an openly gay person will stand in 
direct contradiction to those beliefs and values, it seems to me 
that the enterprise suffers a significant harm.  Thus, in this 
limited circumstance, a legislature may perhaps legitimately 
conclude that the harm to the enterprise will be greater than 
the harm to the particular individuals excluded from such 
positions and provide a narrow exemption from a non-
discrimination mandate in employment.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
In his response to my article, Andy Koppelman correctly 
observes that my suggestions are radical.164  Calling for judicial 
and legislative acknowledgment of a “belief liberty” that 
encompasses any sincerely held core belief can indeed be 
  
 163 My thoughts in this area are shaped by the thirteen years that I 
represented Catholic Charities USA (from 1993 through 2006) in the federal legislative 
arena as Director of the Federal Legislation Clinic at Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
 164 See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination 
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125 
(2006). 
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viewed as a radical departure from the more traditional focus 
on just religiously based beliefs.165
As I hope my analysis has made clear, however, such an 
acknowledgement need not bring the mechanisms of our 
complex society to a screeching halt.  For a court to invalidate a 
law based on its burdening of belief liberty, the court must first 
find that the legislature could not have legitimately enacted 
the law as a “reasonable resolution of contending values.”166  By 
contrast, a legislature is permitted greater latitude and greater 
responsibility to consider and weigh these contending values 
when it enacts legislation in the first place—exactly as it 
should be in a democratic process. 
My primary argument is that we gain something as a 
society if we acknowledge that a law requiring individuals to 
act in a certain way might burden some individuals’ belief 
liberty.  Such an acknowledgement is necessary if we wish to 
be respectful of the whole person.  Protecting one group’s 
identity liberty may, at times, require that we burden others’ 
belief liberty.  This is an inherent and irreconcilable reality of 
our complex society.  But I would rather live in a society where 
we acknowledge that conflict openly, and where we engage in 
an honest dialogue about what accommodations might be 
possible given that reality, than to live in a society where we 
pretend the conflict does not exist in the first place. 
But in dealing with this conflict, I believe it is essential 
that we not privilege moral beliefs that are religiously based 
over other sincerely held core, moral beliefs.  Laws passed 
pursuant to public policies may burden the belief liberty of 
those who adhere to either religious or secular beliefs.  What 
seems of paramount importance to me is that we respect these 
core beliefs and do the best we can in this imperfect world of 
ours to protect both identity liberty and belief liberty to the 
greatest extent possible. 
  
 165 As Koppelman observes, however, some members of the Supreme Court 
have, at times, been quite expansive with what they consider to be a “religiously based” 
belief.  See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). 
 166 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 
